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AbstrAct
This Article introduces to legal scholarship the first sustained discussion of prison 
abolition and what I will call a “prison abolitionist ethic.”  Prisons and punitive policing 
produce tremendous brutality, violence, racial stratification, ideological rigidity, despair, 
and waste.  Meanwhile, incarceration and prison-backed policing neither redress nor 
repair the very sorts of harms they are supposed to address—interpersonal violence, 
addiction, mental illness, and sexual abuse, among others.  Yet despite persistent and 
increasing recognition of the deep problems that attend U.S. incarceration and prison-
backed policing, criminal law scholarship has largely failed to consider how the goals 
of criminal law—principally deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and retributive 
justice—might be pursued by means entirely apart from criminal law enforcement. 
Abandoning prison-backed punishment and punitive policing remains generally 
unfathomable.  This Article argues that the general reluctance to engage seriously an 
abolitionist framework represents a failure of moral, legal, and political imagination.  If 
abolition is understood to entail simply the immediate tearing down of all prison walls, 
then it is easy to dismiss abolition as unthinkable.  But if abolition consists instead of 
an aspirational ethic and a framework of gradual decarceration, which entails a positive 
substitution of other regulatory forms for criminal regulation, then the inattention to 
abolition in criminal law scholarship and reformist discourse comes into focus as a more 
troubling absence.  Although violent crime prevention and proportional punishment of 
wrongdoing purportedly justify imprisonment, this Article illuminates how the ends of 
criminal law might be accomplished in large measure through institutions aside from 
criminal law administration.  More specifically, this Article explores a form of grounded 
preventive justice neglected in existing scholarly, legal, and policy accounts.  Grounded 
preventive justice offers a positive substitutive account of abolition that aims to displace 
criminal law enforcement through meaningful justice reinvestment to strengthen the 
social arm of the state and improve human welfare.  This positive substitutive abolitionist 
framework would operate by expanding social projects to prevent the need for carceral 
responses, decriminalizing less serious infractions, improving the design of spaces and 
products to reduce opportunities for offending, redeveloping and “greening” urban 
spaces, proliferating restorative forms of redress, and creating both safe harbors for 
individuals at risk of or fleeing violence and alternative livelihoods for persons subject 
to criminal law enforcement.  By exploring prison abolition and grounded preventive 
justice in tandem, this Article offers a positive ethical, legal, and institutional framework 
for conceptualizing abolition, crime prevention, and grounded justice together.
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INTRODUCTION 
At bottom, there is one fundamental question: Why do we take prison for granted? 
. . . The most difficult and urgent challenge today is that of creatively exploring new ter-
rains of justice, where the prison no longer serves as our major anchor. 
-Angela Davis, Are Prisons Obsolete?1 
 
[P]reventive justice is, upon every principle of reason, of humanity, and of sound 
policy, preferable in all respects to punishing justice . . . . 
-William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England2  
 
In 1973, the U.S. Department of Justice sponsored a National Advisory 
Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals to study the “American 
Correctional System,” and after extensive research and analysis, the Commission 
published a report concluding that U.S. prisons, juvenile detention centers, and 
jails had established a “shocking record of failure.”3  The Commission recom-
mended a moratorium on prison construction to last ten years.4  Instead, as a vast 
and compelling body of scholarship attests, in the years to follow, both prison 
construction and the U.S. prison population—characterized by stark racial dis-
parities—boomed.5  Forty years later, one in every thirty-five American adults 
was under criminal supervision of some form.6  Penal intervention had become 
even more alarmingly prevalent among African American men.  According to 
some estimates, one of every three young African American men may expect 
  
1. ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? 15, 21 (2003). 
2. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *251 (emphasis omitted). 
3. NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS & GOALS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, REPORT ON CORRECTIONS 597 (1973). 
4. See id. 
5. See, e.g., DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN 
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 168 (2001); NICOLA LACEY, THE PRISONERS’ DILEMMA: 
POLITICAL ECONOMY AND PUNISHMENT IN CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACIES (2008); 
JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME 
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR (2007); 
BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA (2006). 
6. See LAUREN E. GLAZE & DANIELLE KAEBLE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2013 (Dec. 19, 2014), 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus13.pdf.  As of 2003, one in every one hundred forty 
U.S. residents was in prison or jail .PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2003, at 2 (Nov. 2004). 
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to spend part of his life in prison or jail.7  In 2009, Senator Jim Webb tried and 
failed to establish another National Criminal Justice Commission, though nu-
merous experts testified that U.S. prisons and jails were still “broken and ailing,”8 
a “national disgrace,”9 and reflected rampant “horrors” of sexual abuse and vio-
lence10—in short, that U.S. prisons and jails were in a state of “crisis.”11 
Apart from the inhumanity of incarceration, there is good reason to doubt 
the efficacy of incarceration and prison-backed policing as means of managing 
the complex social problems they are tasked with addressing, whether interper-
sonal violence, addiction, mental illness, or sexual abuse.12  Moreover, beyond 
  
7. See THOMAS P. BONCZAR, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PREVALENCE OF 
IMPRISONMENT IN THE U.S. POPULATION, 1974–2001, at 1 (Aug. 2003), http:// 
bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/piusp01.pdf (reporting that if then-current incarceration 
rates continued, one in three black men could expect to serve time in prison); BECKY 
PETTIT, INVISIBLE MEN: MASS INCARCERATION AND THE MYTH OF BLACK 
PROGRESS 1 (2012) (same).  See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM 
CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 2 (2012) (arguing 
that old forms of racial subordination have not been entirely eliminated but rather 
reconfigured in criminal law administration); DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE 
AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1999) (examining race- 
and class-based inequities in U.S. criminal law administration). 
8. Exploring the National Criminal Justice Commission Act of 2009: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Crime and Drugs of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 31 (2009) (statement of William J. 
Bratton, Chief of Police, Los Angeles Police Department).  
9. Id. at 7 (quoting George Kelling). 
10. Id. at 13 (statement of Pat Nolan, Vice President, Prison Fellowship, Lansdowne, Virginia). 
11. Id. at 12. 
12. See, e.g., States Cut Both Crime and Imprisonment, PEW CHARITABLE TR. (Dec. 19, 2013), 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/multimedia/data-visualizations/2013/states-cut-both-crime-and-
imprisonment (revealing that numerous states have reduced crime and incarceration rates at the 
same time and suggesting that maintaining large prison populations is not necessary from a public 
safety standpoint); RUSSELL SAGE FOUND., DO PRISONS MAKE US SAFER?  THE BENEFITS 
AND COSTS OF THE PRISON BOOM 2 (Steven Raphael & Michael A. Stoll eds., 2009) (noting 
the growing evidence of the destructive consequences of imprisonment, including vast allocation 
of public resources to incarceration at the cost of public spending in other areas such as education, 
diminishing crime-reductive returns associated with increases in incarceration, instability of family 
and community ties among high prison-sending demographics, depressed labor-market 
opportunities for persons with criminal convictions and consequent pressures to reoffend, legal 
disenfranchisement of former prisoners, and the acceleration of communicable diseases such as 
AIDS among inmates and their non-incarcerated intimates); JOHN SCHMITT ET AL., CTR. FOR 
ECON. & POL’Y RESEARCH, THE HIGH BUDGETARY COST OF INCARCERATION (2010) 
(demonstrating the exorbitant costs of incarceration and substantial potential savings associated 
with decarceration that could be devoted to other important governmental and public functions); 
DON STEMEN, VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, RECONSIDERING INCARCERATION: NEW 
DIRECTIONS FOR REDUCING CRIME 2 (Jan. 2007), http://www.vera.org/sites/default 
/files/resources/downloads/veraincarc_vFW2.pdf (proposing that “effective public safety strategies 
should move away from an exclusive focus on incarceration to . . . a more comprehensive policy 
framework for safeguarding citizens,” one that would incorporate reductions in unemployment, 
increases in real wage rates, and improved educational opportunities); see also Allegra M. McLeod, 
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prisons and jails, broader reliance on punitive policing to handle myriad social 
problems leads to routine use of excessive police force and to volatile, often vio-
lent, police-citizen relations.13 
Yet, despite persistent and increasing recognition of the problems that at-
tend incarceration and punitive policing in the United States, criminal law and 
criminological scholarship almost uniformly stop short of considering how the 
professed goals of the criminal law—principally deterrence, incapacitation, reha-
bilitation, and retributive justice—might be approached by means entirely apart 
from criminal law enforcement.14  Abandoning carceral punishment and punitive 
policing remains generally unfathomable.15 
  
Regulating Sexual Harm: Strangers, Intimates and Social Institutional Reform, 102 CAL. L. REV. 
1553, 1557 (2014) (exploring the various criminogenic effects of U.S. criminal sex offense 
regulations). 
13. See Paul Butler, Stop and Frisk: Sex, Torture, Control, in LAW AS PUNISHMENT / LAW AS 
REGULATION 155, 155 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2011) (“[S]tops and frisks cause injuries similar 
to those of illegal forms of tortures . . . .”). 
14. See, e.g., MARIE GOTTSCHALK, THE PRISON AND THE GALLOWS: THE POLITICS OF MASS 
INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 239 (2006) (proposing that “the U.S. penal system [be infused] 
with an ethos of respect and dignity for its millions of prisoners, parolees, probationers, and 
former prisoners that is sorely lacking”); DAVID M. KENNEDY, DON’T SHOOT: ONE MAN, A 
STREET FELLOWSHIP, AND THE END OF VIOLENCE IN INNER-CITY AMERICA (2011) 
(exploring a model for reducing incarceration focused on collaboration between police, 
prosecutors, and community members to agree upon cessation of criminal activity with provision 
of social services and under threat of severe criminal enforcement in the event of gang member 
noncompliance); MARK A.R. KLEIMAN, WHEN BRUTE FORCE FAILS: HOW TO HAVE LESS 
CRIME AND LESS PUNISHMENT 115 (2009) (proposing a regime of intensive probation 
supervision backed by flash incarceration as a manner of reducing reliance on imprisonment); 
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CITY THAT BECAME SAFE: NEW YORK’S LESSONS FOR 
URBAN CRIME AND ITS CONTROL 131–32, 147–50, 194–95 (2012) (arguing that New York 
City-style “hot spot” and other associated policing tactics stand to reduce crime and incarceration 
and contending that no other factor can explain New York City’s concomitant drop in crime and 
incarceration during a period when other parts of the country experienced increases in 
incarceration); see also PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE: A HIP-HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE 4 
(2009) (“‘Criminal justice’ is what happens after a complicated series of events has gone bad.  It is 
the end result of failure—the failure of a group of people that sometimes includes, but is never 
limited to, the accused person.  What I am not saying: prison should be abolished; people should 
not be held accountable for their actions.  I don’t believe that. . . .  I will never deny that society 
needs an official way to punish . . . .”); David Cole, Turning the Corner on Mass Incarceration?, 9 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 27, 41 (2011) (proposing reduced sentence lengths, direction of resources 
to address root causes of crime, and expanded empathy, but noting that “incarceration is 
frequently necessary” for the “half of the incarcerated population [that is] serving time for violent 
crimes”); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 603 
(1996) (“The law can discourage criminality not just by ‘raising the cost’ of such behavior through 
punishments, but also through instilling aversions to the kinds of behavior that the law 
prohibits.”); Louis Michael Seidman, Hyper-Incarceration and Strategies of Disruption: Is There a 
Way Out?, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 109 (2011) (exploring various reformist responses to large-
scale use of incarceration including criminal procedure liberalism, experimental prison education 
programs, drug courts, and ideology critique, among other efforts, and finding there “is little 
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If prison abolition is conceptualized as an immediate and indiscriminate 
opening of prison doors—that is, the imminent physical elimination of all struc-
tures of incarceration—rejection of abolition is perhaps warranted.  But abolition 
may be understood instead as a gradual project of decarceration, in which radically 
different legal and institutional regulatory forms supplant criminal law enforce-
ment.  These institutional alternatives include meaningful justice reinvestment to 
strengthen the social arm of the state and improve human welfare; decriminalizing 
less serious infractions; improved design of spaces and products to reduce oppor-
tunities for offending; urban redevelopment and “greening” projects; proliferating 
restorative forms of redress; and creating both safe harbors for individuals at risk 
of or fleeing violence and alternative livelihoods for persons otherwise subject to 
criminal law enforcement.  When abolition is conceptualized in these terms—as 
a transformative goal of gradual decarceration and positive regulatory substitution 
wherein penal regulation is recognized as morally unsustainable—then inatten-
tion to abolition in criminal law scholarship and reformist discourses comes into 
focus as a more troubling absence.16  Further, the rejection of abolition as a hori-
zon for reform mistakenly assumes that reformist critiques concern only the occa-
sional, peripheral excesses of imprisonment and prison-backed policing rather 
than more fundamentally impugning the core operations of criminal law en-
forcement, and therefore requiring a departure from prison-backed criminal 
regulation to other regulatory frameworks. 
This Article thus introduces to legal scholarship the first sustained discus-
sion of what I will call a “prison abolitionist framework” and a “prison abolitionist 
ethic.”  By a “prison abolitionist framework,” I mean a set of principles and posi-
tive projects oriented toward substituting a constellation of other regulatory and 
social projects for criminal law enforcement.  By a “prison abolitionist ethic,” I 
intend to invoke and build upon a moral orientation elaborated in an existing 
  
reason . . . to be hopeful about the possibilities of change”); Carol S. Steiker, Tempering or 
Tampering?  Mercy and the Administration of Criminal Justice, in FORGIVENESS, MERCY AND 
CLEMENCY 16, 31 (Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussain eds., 2007) (“Given the predictability of an 
ever-upward tending ratchet of punishment . . . we need some counterratchet, some way of 
checking this tendency and working against it.  I contend that the ideal of mercy—taken quite 
self-consciously from the very religious tradition that contributes to retributivism’s ratchet—is that 
necessary counterbalance. . . .  [M]ercy is [a] virtue that can be cultivated not only by the actors 
who exercise discretion within the criminal justice system but also by the general public . . . .”). 
15. See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 1, at 9–10 (“[T]he prison is considered an inevitable and permanent 
feature of our social lives. . . .  In most circles prison abolition is simply unthinkable and 
implausible.  Prison abolitionists are dismissed as utopians and idealists whose ideas are at best 
unrealistic and impracticable, and, at worst, mystifying and foolish.”). 
16. See, e.g., Liat Ben-Moshe, The Tension Between Abolition and Reform, in THE END OF PRISONS: 
REFLECTIONS FROM THE DECARCERATION MOVEMENT 83, 85–87, 92 (Mechthild E. 
Nagel & Anthony J. Nocella II eds., 2013). 
1162 62 UCLA L. REV. 1156 (2015) 
body of abolitionist writings and nascent social movement efforts, which are 
committed to ending the practice of confining people in cages and eliminating 
the control of human beings through imminently threatened police use of vio-
lent force.17  I argue that abolition in these terms issues a more compelling moral, 
legal, and political call than has been recognized to date. 
Prison abolition—both as a body of critical social thought and as an emer-
gent social movement—draws on earlier abolitionist ideas, particularly the writ-
ings of W.E.B. Du Bois on the abolition of slavery.18  According to Du Bois, to 
be meaningful, abolition required more than the simple eradication of slavery; 
abolition ought to have been a positive project as opposed to a merely negative 
one.19  Du Bois wrote that simply declaring an end to a tradition of violent forced 
labor was insufficient to abolish slavery.20  Abolition instead required the creation 
of new democratic forms in which the institutions and ideas previously implicat-
ed in slavery would be remade to incorporate those persons formerly enslaved and 
to enable a different future for all members of the polity.21  To be meaningful, the 
abolition of slavery required fundamentally reconstructing social, economic and 
  
17. See, e.g., Reina Gossett & Dean Spade, No One Is Disposable: Everyday Practices of Prison 
Abolition (2014), available at http://bcrw.barnard.edu/event/no-one-is-disposable-everyday-
practices-of-prison-abolition.  
18. Ben-Moshe, supra note 16, at 85. 
19. See W.E.B. DU BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA (Transaction Publishers 2013) 
(1935).  Du Bois explains: “The South . . . opposed . . . education, opposed land and 
capital. . . and violently and bitterly opposed any political power.  It fought every conception inch 
by inch: no real emancipation, limited civil rights. . . . ”  Id. at 166.  Du Bois concludes: “Slavery 
was not abolished even after the Thirteenth Amendment.  There were four million freedmen and 
most of them on the same plantation, doing the same work that they did before emancipation . . . .”  
Id. at 169.  In response to the question of how freedom was to “be made a fact,” Du Bois wrote: “It 
could be done in only one way. . . .  They must have land; they must have education.”  Id.  “The 
abolition of slavery meant not simply abolition of legal ownership of the slave; it meant the uplift of 
slaves and their eventual incorporation into the body civil, politic, and social, of the United States.”  
Id. at 170. 
20. See id. at 175 (citing with approval Charles Sumner’s exhortation that with emancipation, the 
work of abolition “is only half done”). 
21. See id. at 194–95 (discussing the potential, and ultimate, abolition of the Freedmen’s Bureau, 
“the most extraordinary and far-reaching institution of social uplift that America has ever 
attempted,” the aim of which was to transition refugees and free persons “from a feudal 
agrarianism to [more equitable and just] modern farming and industry”); see also id. at 198 (“For 
the stupendous work which the Freedmen’s Bureau must attempt, it had every 
disadvantage . . . . It was so limited in time that it had small chance for efficient and 
comprehensive planning.  It had at first no appropriated funds . . . . Further than this it had to 
use a rough military machine for administrating delicate social reform.”).  “The Freedmen’s 
Bureau did an extraordinary piece of work but it was but a small and imperfect part of what it 
might have done if it had been made a permanent institution, given ample funds for operating 
schools and purchasing land . . . .”  Id. at 204. 
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political arrangements.22  In the aftermath of slavery in the United States, re-
construction fell far short of this mark in many respects, and criminal law ad-
ministration played a central role in the brutal afterlife of slavery.23  The work of 
abolition remained then—and arguably still remains today—to be completed.  
Confronting criminal law’s continuing violence is an important part of that un-
dertaking. 
Along these lines, then, a prison abolitionist framework involves initiatives 
directed toward positive rather than exclusively negative abolition.  A prison abo-
litionist framework entails, more specifically, developing and implementing other 
positive substitutive social projects, institutions, and conceptions of regulating 
our collective social lives and redressing shared problems—interventions that 
might over the longer term render imprisonment and criminal law enforcement 
peripheral to ensuring relative peace and security.  Efforts of prison abolitionist 
organizations, such as Critical Resistance and the Prison Moratorium Project, to 
both oppose imprisonment and enable access to food, shelter, community-based 
mediation, public safety, and well-being without penal intervention exemplify 
this orientation towards positive abolition.24  Conceived of as such, abolition is a 
matter both of decarceration and substitutive social—not penal—regulation.  
  
22. See id. at 213 (“[Abolition required] civil and political rights, education and land, as the only 
complete guarantee of freedom, in the face of a dominant South which hoped from the first, to 
abolish slavery only in name.”). 
23. See id. at 451 (“The whole criminal system came to be used as a method of keeping Negroes at 
work and intimidating them.  Consequently there began to be a demand for jails and 
penitentiaries beyond the natural demand due to the rise of crime.”). 
24. See, e.g., About, CRITICAL RESISTANCE, http://criticalresistance.org/about (last visited 
Apr. 11, 2015).  Critical Resistance’s Vision Statement reads as follows: 
Critical Resistance’s vision is the creation of genuinely healthy, stable com-
munities that respond to harm without relying on imprisonment and punishment.  
We call our vision abolition, drawing, in part from the legacy of the abolition of 
slavery in the 1800’s.  As PIC [prison industrial complex] abolitionists we under-
stand that the prison industrial complex is not a broken system to be fixed.  The 
system, rather, works precisely as it is designed to—to contain, control, and kill 
those people representing the greatest threats to state power.  Our goal is not to 
improve the system even further, but to shrink the system into non-existence.  We 
work to build healthy, self-determined communities and promote alternatives to 
the current system. 
Id.   
The Prison Moratorium Project also seeks to proliferate responses to interpersonal conflict 
and forms of community flourishing that do not rely on the penal arm of the state. The 
Prison Moratorium Project organizes boycotts of further prison and jail construction, but also 
works to empower community members to resolve disputes through means other than 
criminal law enforcement, and to expand access to education and social institutions apart from 
policing and penal interventions.  Prison Moratorium Project, SOC. JUSTICE MOVEMENTS, 
http://socialjustice.ccnmtl.columbia.edu/index.php/Prison_Moratorium_Project (last visited 
Apr. 11, 2015). 
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In contrast to leading scholarly and policy efforts to reform criminal law, 
abolition decidedly does not seek merely to replace incarceration with alternatives 
that are closely related to imprisonment, such as punitive policing, noncustodial 
criminal supervision, probation, civil institutionalization, and parole.25  Abolition 
instead entails a rejection of the moral legitimacy of confining people in cages, 
whether that caging is deemed “civil” or whether it follows a failure to comply 
with technical terms of supervised release or a police order.26  So too the positive 
project of abolition addressed in this Article is decidedly not an effort to replicate 
the institutional transfer that occurred in the aftermath of the deinstitution-
alization of mental institutions.27  An abolitionist framework requires positive 
forms of social integration and collective security that are not organized around 
criminal law enforcement, confinement, criminal surveillance, punitive policing, 
or punishment. 
This distinction between substitutive nonpenal social regulation and 
noncustodial (but still criminal) supervision is an important one because the 
use of quasi-criminal noncustodial supervisory preventive measures dramati-
cally increased alongside (and as an extension of) prison-based punishment 
during the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.28  These purportedly 
preventive measures include stop and frisk policing, noncustodial criminal su-
pervision, registration requirements for people convicted of certain crimes (espe-
cially sex-related offenses),29 and preventive detention.30  These punitive 
preventive measures—often referred to as “preventive justice” interventions—have 
  
25. See, e.g., KLEIMAN, supra note 14; ZIMRING, supra note 14, at 131–32, 147–50; see also Issa 
Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 611, 614–15 
(2014) (exploring how misdemeanor case processing involves a largely noncustodial criminal 
supervisory regime of “managing people over time through engagement with the criminal justice 
system”). 
26. See generally Bernard E. Harcourt, From the Asylum to the Prison: Rethinking the Incarceration 
Revolution, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1751 (2006) (revealing that the aggregate rate of involuntary 
institutional confinement over the course of the twentieth century remained more constant than 
previously recognized, if confinement is taken to include both commitment to mental hospitals, as 
well as incarceration in prisons and jails).  
27.  See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Past and Future of Deinstitutionalization Litigation, 34 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (2012); Robert Weisberg, Restorative Justice and the Danger of “Community”, 
2003 UTAH L. REV. 343, 364. 
28. See generally Bernard E. Harcourt, Punitive Preventive Justice: A Critique, in PREVENTION AND 
THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 252 (Andrew Ashworth et al. eds., 2013) (detailing the 
expanded use of punitive preventive measures, comparing the purported efficacy of such measures 
with the empirical data, and arguing that the need for such measures is overstated and really a 
product less of crime reduction and more, as with prisons generally, of control). 
29. See, e.g., Allegra M. McLeod, Regulating Sexual Harm: Strangers, Intimates, and Social Institutional 
Reform, 102 CAL. L. REV. 1553, 1573–80 (2014). 
30. See ANDREW ASHWORTH & LUCIA ZEDNER, PREVENTIVE JUSTICE 144–70 (2014). 
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generated a body of predominantly critical scholarship.31  This critical scholarship 
identifies how these contemporary punitive preventive interventions eviscerate 
important liberty interests and violate basic criminal rule of law principles, pri-
marily by imposing significant adverse consequences before a meaningful, proce-
durally regular finding of guilt.32  Much of this work also considers what 
procedural protections would be required to render such preventive restraints 
more just.33 
Yet, just as scholars addressing overincarceration and overcriminalization in 
the United States tend to not consider abolition as a reformist framework, or to 
engage reformist strategies that operate entirely separate from criminal law en-
forcement, so too the preventive justice literature hardly entertains preventive jus-
tice’s possible manifestations outside the context of criminal and quasi-criminal 
law enforcement or punitive prevention.34  Nor does this important body of 
work, for the most part, consider how the problems associated with punitive 
prevention (from its procedural laxity to its broader injustice) run from peripher-
al exercises of punitive preventive measures all the way to criminal law enforce-
ment’s core practices.35 
But preventive justice, in its overlooked iterations—outside the criminal law 
context—may begin to illuminate how it might be possible to rely radically less 
on criminal law enforcement to serve the ends of security and collective peace.  
This neglected version of preventive justice, which focuses on social rather than 
penal projects, is consistent with (even essential to) an abolitionist framework and 
may be understood to date back as far as to the late eighteenth and early nine-
teenth centuries, a period preceding the establishment of professional police forc-
es and large prison and jail systems.36  During this period, social reformers, 
including most famously Jeremy Bentham, contemplated how to maintain peace 
  
31. See, e.g., PREVENTION AND THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 28. 
32. See id. 
33. See ASHWORTH & ZEDNER, supra note 30, at 261 (“The general conclusion is that there should 
be no deprivation of liberty without the provision of appropriate procedural safeguards.”). 
34. See, e.g., id. at 2–7 (explaining that those preventive approaches that do not involve criminal 
regulatory or quasi-criminal regulatory coercion are generally beyond the scope of the relevant 
extant scholarship). 
35. But see Frederick Schauer, The Ubiquity of Prevention, in PREVENTION AND THE LIMITS OF 
THE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 28, at 12, 22. 
36. See, e.g., GARY T. MARX, UNDERCOVER: POLICE SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA 20–21 (1988) 
(“After intense debate, a permanent municipal public police force was created in London in 
1829. . . . Drawing on ideas of the utilitarian philosophers . . . the British police were to be 
unarmed, uniformed and on duty 24 hours a day throughout the city. . . . Advocates of this system 
argued that it was more consistent with British traditions of liberty, and more humane and 
effective, to prevent crime from ever occurring.  The alternative was to rely on draconian 
punishment after the fact. . . .”). 
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and security without unduly imperiling individual freedom and without involving 
professional police and security forces, let alone massive networks of criminal de-
tention facilities.37  Quite separate from Bentham’s famous plans for a panoptic 
prison, this social reform project sought to prevent crime and harm without in-
volving what we now understand as criminal law enforcement.38  Crime preven-
tion, as early reformers conceptualized it, ought to be realized in large part 
through social projects that reduced risks of harm and engaged people in com-
mon endeavors through infrastructure, education, and social integration, not 
primarily through punitive policing or prison-backed punishment.39  Bentham 
called these efforts “indirect legislation” to capture the concept of governmental 
interventions that operated “off the beaten track” to shape socially constructive, 
peaceable interaction at a distance by “triggering . . . remote effects.”40  In con-
trast, William Blackstone’s conception of preventive justice centered on “oblig-
ing those persons whom there is a probable ground to suspect of future misbe-
misbehavior to . . . give full assurance . . . that such offence as is apprehended 
shall not happen . . . .”41  But preventive justice in this alternative register invoked 
by Bentham, and focused on a broader regulatory environment separate from 
criminal law enforcement (and also separate from characterological assessments 
of criminality of the sort Blackstone imagined), operated little, if at all,  with re-
course to instruments of the criminal process.42   
Admittedly, much of Bentham’s writings on regulating crime are disturb-
ing, even distinctly bizarre.  For instance, he wrote extensively of tattooing all 
British subjects for identification purposes (and to prevent crime).43  The purpose 
of invoking this earlier body of thought, though, is not to defend it in its entirety 
but to summon an alternative tradition of harm and crime prevention focused on 
addressing violence and social discord through socially integrative and transform-
  
37. See JEREMY BENTHAM, Of Indirect Means of Preventing Crimes, in A FRAGMENT ON 
GOVERNMENT AND AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION (Wilfrid Harrison ed., 1760) (1948); see also GARLAND, supra note 5, at 31 
(examining how the character of crime control has shifted slowly over the past two centuries “from 
being a generalized responsibility of citizens and civil society to being a specialist undertaking 
largely monopolized by the state’s [criminal] law-enforcement system”). 
38. See Philip Schofield, Panopticon, in BENTHAM: A GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED 70 (2009). 
39. See BENTHAM, supra note 37;  GARLAND, supra note 5, at 31. 
40. Stephen G. Engelmann, “Indirect Legislation”: Bentham’s Liberal Government, 35 POLITY 369, 377 
(2003). 
41. BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at *251. 
42. See, e.g., Engelmann, supra note 40, at 372 (“For Bentham, the contours of any subject who can be 
freed or chained are drawn entirely by an existing regulatory environment.  He aspires to better 
arrange what he sees as a field of practices that supplies the very meanings of interference and 
laissez-faire.”). 
43. See id. at 371.  
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ative projects aside from criminal law enforcement, projects within which people 
are able to more equitably and freely govern themselves.44  At this earlier time, the 
notion that order would be maintained primarily by punitive policing and prison-
based punishment remained highly controversial, too similar to tyranny to obtain 
much support.45 
At present, this often-overlooked form of crime prevention is manifest on a 
small, incipient scale in a range of efforts to shift resources from criminalization 
to other social and political projects.  These efforts simultaneously aim to prevent 
theft, violence, and other criminalized conduct, through empowerment and 
movement building among vulnerable groups, urban redevelopment, product de-
sign, institutional design, and alternative livelihoods programs.46  Whereas the 
interventions typically captured under the rubric of preventive justice generally 
aim to avert harmful conduct before it occurs by targeting persons believed to be 
prone to criminal offending, what I will call grounded preventive justice may be 
understood to operate through this variety of measures not engaged at all with the 
criminal process.  These structural reform measures focus instead on expanding 
the space in which people are safe from interpersonal harm and are able to forge 
relationships of greater equality.  These measures are less heavily overshadowed 
by the legacies of racial and other forms of subordination too often perpetuated in 
the United States through criminal law enforcement.  Preventive justice may be 
reconceptualized in these terms as a crucial component of an abolitionist frame-
work, both in its critical analysis of punitive preventive forms of state intervention 
and in this overlooked alternative iteration as grounded noncriminal prevention 
through institutional and structural reforms. 
Accordingly, this Article explores these two discourses—prison abolition 
and preventive justice—seldom considered in tandem, in order to make vivid the 
promise of abolition as a manner of envisioning meaningful criminal law reform, 
as well as the related possibilities of crime prevention focused on structural reform 
rather than individualized criminal targeting.  Prison abolition, on this account, is 
an aspirational ethical, institutional, and political framework that aims to funda-
  
44. See, e.g., P. COLQUHOUN, A TREATISE ON THE POLICE OF THE METROPOLIS 594 (7th ed. 
1806) (showing that Scottish Magistrate Colquhoun’s account of “prevention” of crime and 
“policing” focused on an array of regulations including lighting, paving, coach stands, and 
governance of markets).  But see Engelmann, supra note 40, at 370 n.1; id. at 383 (explaining how 
Bentham envisioned tattooing would improve social trust broadly, wherein any social encounter 
could be entered with the following assuring words, as Bentham wrote: “Sir, I don’t know you, but 
shew me your mark, and it shall be as you desire”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
45. See, e.g., SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE POLICE OF THE METROPOLIS, THIRD REPORT, 
1818, H.C. 32 (U.K.); ASHWORTH & ZEDNER, supra note 30, at 37. 
46. See infra Part IV. 
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mentally reconceptualize security and collective social life, rather than simply a 
plan to tear down prison walls.  As such, abolition seeks to ultimately render 
“prisons obsolete.”47 
Before proceeding further, it bears noting that there may be, in the end, 
some people who are so dangerous to others that they cannot live safely among 
us, those rare persons referred to in abolitionist writings as “the dangerous few.”48  
Who and how many are the dangerous few?  The answer to this question is by no 
means self-evident but its complete and final resolution ought not to interfere 
with serious engagement with abolitionist analysis, given that there are many 
millions of the one in thirty five American adults presently living under criminal 
supervision who fall outside any such small category that may exist.49 U.S. jails, 
and to a lesser extent U.S. prisons, house numerous people who have never com-
mitted acts of violence or perpetrated serious harm against others at all.50  Decar-
ceration as it relates to this population is relatively less controversial, as there are 
many thousands of people incarcerated in this category that are plainly outside 
any plausible definition of the dangerous few.51 
Further, the category of the dangerous few is absolutely not reducible to 
those individuals who are presently incarcerated in state prisons after being con-
victed of violent crimes—by some estimates about half of the U.S. prison popula-
tion.52  Many persons convicted of violent offenses have not even committed what 
are commonly understood as acts of violence: Possession of a gun or statutory rape 
  
47. See DAVIS, supra note 1 (introducing a theory of the possible obsolescence of prisons in her path-
breaking abolitionist account). 
48. See PRISON RESEARCH EDUC. ACTION PROJECT, INSTEAD OF PRISONS: A HANDBOOK FOR 
ABOLITIONISTS 81, 135 (Mark Morris ed., 1976). I use this terminology—“the dangerous 
few”—because of its prominence in certain strands of abolitionist disoucrse and because it 
captures succinctly the anticipated objection of a critic who resists an abolitionist framework in 
virtue of a concern for public safety. There is reason, though, to be skeptical of this phrasing 
in virtue of the amorphous bogeymen it conjures and because of its potential unstated raced, 
classed, and other assumptions. 
49. See GLAZE & KAEBLE, supra note 6. 
50. See MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF 
AMERICAN POLITICS 258 (2015) (“[N]umerous people are serving time today for nonviolent 
offenses, many of them property or petty drug offenses, that would not warrant a sentence in 
many other countries.”). 
51. See, e.g., John F. Pfaff, Waylaid by a Metaphor: A Deeply Problematic Account of Prison Growth, 111 
MICH. L. REV. 1087, 1088 (2013) (explaining that a relatively small proportion of prison growth 
is attributable to the incarceration of low-level nonviolent drug offenses).  
52. See GOTTSCHALK, supra note 50, at 169 (“[O]n closer inspection, all ‘violent’ offenders are not 
necessarily what they first seem.”).  As Jonathan Simon has explained, “violence is a much 
more capacious legal category than most people assume.”  Leon Neyfakh, OK, so Who Gets to Go 
Free?, SLATE (Mar. 4, 2015, 3:37 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/ 
crime/2015/03/prison_reform_releasing_only_nonviolent_offenders_won_t_get_you_very_far.html.  
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are often classified as violent crimes.53  Additionally, homicide in the United 
States and other crimes properly categorized as violent are often a product of par-
ticipation in illegal economies where the only means of dispute resolution may 
involve violence.54  Enabling other livelihoods outside criminalized markets, and 
decriminalizing certain narcotics markets, would reduce considerably the dangers 
those criminalized livelihoods pose.55  Participants in those markets are thus not 
properly understood as part of the dangerous few.  Their criminal conduct would 
be displaced by a wider embrace of a positive substitutive abolitionist program.   
Others who are convicted of crimes of violence are not especially dangerous 
and would not perpetrate such violence if they had a means of self-support or 
means of mental health care or other necessary care that would enable them to 
avoid criminal process contact in the future.56  This point is powerfully conveyed 
by the experience of those who committed heinous, violent crimes as young peo-
ple—including murders, carjackings, beheadings, and torture—after which these 
individuals moved on to full, productive, even altruistic lives of service to others 
through contributions to social justice, culture, business, and the arts.57 
Moreover, current enforcement patterns disproportionately focus on certain 
forms of often racialized criminal threat and ignore altogether other forms of 
grave interpersonal harm. Racially targeted policing and racial disproportionality 
throughout the criminal process reflect how crime and threat are understood in 
reference to race in ways that exacerbate racialized police violence and distract at-
tention entirely from actual locations of danger.58 Many currently dangerous 
people who perpetrate vast economic harms, or abuse the vulnerable too afraid 
to seek redress, or wage unjust wars that kill many thousands, will never face 
  
53. See GOTTSCHALK, supra note 50, at 169; Neyfakh, supra note 52. 
54. See GOTTSCHALK, supra note 50, at 276–77 (“[C]rime is distributed in highly unequal ways, 
and . . . unacceptably high rates of violent crime persist in certain urban neighborhoods. . . . The 
homicide victimization rate for young black men involved in criminally active groups in a high 
crime neighborhood on Chicago’s west side is 3,000 per 100,000, or about 600 times the national 
rate.  Put another way, this is three times the risk of stepping on a landmine in Afghanistan, a real 
war zone.”) (citations omitted). 
55. See id.at 278–79 (“If the United States is serious about addressing these high levels of concentrated 
violence, then it has to be serious about addressing the country’s high levels of inequality and 
concentrated poverty. . . . What we do know conclusively is that states and countries that spend 
more on social welfare tend to have lower incarceration rates, and high rates of inequality are 
associated with higher rates of imprisonment and higher rates of crime.”). 
56. See id. at 169; Neyfakh, supra note 52. 
57.   See Brief of Former Juvenile Offenders Charles S. Dutton, et al. Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners, Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (No. 08-7412), 2009 WL 2219302. 
58. See, e.g., Devon Carbado, Legalizing Racial Profiling (forthcoming 2015) (draft on file with 
author). 
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punishment for their wrongdoing in the criminal process.59 While racially tar-
geted policing of minor offenses is rampant in many jurisdictions, the vast ma-
jority of rapes and sexual assaults go unaddressed, and many economic wrongs are 
not understood as dangerous or as crimes.60  
But even those egregious forms of economic wrongdoing, like the harms 
perpetrated by Bernard Madoff and his associates, might well be better managed 
through other forms of preventive regulation than through incarcerating those 
individuals after the fact.61 Similarly, other regulatory and social projects promise 
to reduce gun violence and other forms of interpersonal harm without invoking 
the criminal process at all.62 
In short, there are many who have committed acts of violence but who, un-
der circumstances of social coexistence enabled by positive abolition, would pose 
no threat of harm to themselves or others.  A commitment to any significant 
decarceration, let alone abolition, entails more than simply eliminating incarcera-
tion for nonviolent, nonserious, nonfelony convictions,63 or less serious felony 
convictions classified as violent.64  Even people convicted of serious, violent felo-
nies are not properly understood as the dangerous few and should be able to live 
their lives outside of cages.  A commitment to any significant degree of decar-
ceration requires a willingness to abandon managing perceived risks of vio-
  
59. See, e.g., ROSE CORRIGAN, UP AGAINST A WALL: RAPE REFORM AND THE FAILURE OF 
SUCCESS (2013) (examining the dramatic under reporting and under enforcement of violations of 
criminal laws relating to rape and sexual assault). 
60. See, e.g., id.; McLeod, supra note 29; Carbado, supra note 58. 
61. See Associated Press, Madoff Aide Gets 10 Years in Prison for Role in Fraud, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/09/business/madoff-aide-gets-10-years-in-prison-for-
role-in-fraud.html. 
62. See infra text accompanying notes 335 and 350–355. 
63. See GOTTSCHALK, supra note 50, at 169 (“The proportion of people in prison for drug law 
violations because they were exclusively users amounts to 4 percent of drug offenders in state and 
federal prisons and just 1 percent of all prisoners.”).  
64. See Dana Goldstein, How to Cut the Prison Population by 50 Percent, MARSHALL PROJECT (Mar. 
4, 2015, 7:15 AM) (“To halve the prison population, sentencing would have to change not only 
for the so-called ‘non, non, nons’—non-violent, non-serious, and non-sex offender criminals—but 
also for some offenders convicted of violent crimes. . . . Simple math shows why violent offenders 
would have to be part of any serious attempt to halve the number of prisoners.  Consider the 
nation’s largest incarcerated population, the 1,315,000 held in state prisons.  Only 4 percent are 
there for drug possession.  An additional 12 percent are incarcerated for drug sales, 
manufacturing, or trafficking.  Eleven percent are there for public order offenses such as 
prostitution or drunk driving, and 19 percent for property crimes such as fraud and car theft, 
including some property crimes that many consider serious or violent, such as home invasion.”); see 
also Eric L. Sevigny & Jonathan P. Caulkins, Kingpins or Mules: An Analysis of Drug Offenders 
Incarcerated in Federal and State Prisons, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 401, 421–22 (2004) 
(finding that “unambiguously low-level drug offenders” comprise less than 6 percent of state 
inmates and less than 2 percent of federal inmates); GOTTSCHALK, supra note 50, at 259 (stating 
that “reducing the time served for a wider range of offenders is necessary”). 
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lence by banishing and relegating to civil death any person convicted of serious 
crime. Reducing social risk by physically isolating and caging entire populations 
is not morally defensible, even if abandoning such practices may increase some 
forms of social disorder.   
If there are indeed some small subset of people properly denominated the 
dangerous few, they are only those who are intent on perpetrating acts of vicious 
harm against others such that they are an imminent threat to all those around 
them regardless of their circumstances.  An abolitionist framework is not neces-
sarily committed to denying the existence of these dangerous few persons, though 
the dangerous few are vastly outnumbered by many millions of nondangerous in-
dividuals living under criminal supervision and any such dangerousness on the 
part of those incarcerated currently is exacerbated by features of prison society 
that a wider embrace of an abolitionist ethic and framework would improve.  Be-
cause any such dangerous few persons constitute at most only a small minority 
of the many millions of people under criminal supervision in the United 
States—the one of every thirty-five American adults under criminal supervision 
of some form65—the question of the danger these few may pose can be deferred 
for some time as decarceration could by political necessity only proceed gradu-
ally. And so the question of the dangerous few ought not to eclipse or overwhelm 
the urgency of a thorough consideration of abolitionist analyses and reformist 
projects of displacement of criminal regulation by other regulatory approaches.   
In any event, an abolitionist ethic recognizes that even if a person is so awful 
in her violence that the threat she poses must be forcibly contained, this course of 
action ought to be undertaken with moral conflict, circumspection, and even 
shame, as a choice of the lesser of two evils, rather than as an achievement of jus-
tice.  To respond to victims of violence justly would be to make them whole and 
to address forms of collective vulnerability so those and other persons are less like-
ly to be harmed again. Even when confronting the dangerous few, on an aboli-
tionist account, justice is not meaningfully achieved by caging, degrading, or even 
more humanely confining, the person who assaulted the vulnerable among us. 
This Article develops these arguments in five parts.  Part I aims to motivate 
the case for a prison abolitionist ethic.  Part II argues that an abolitionist ethic 
promises to address U.S. criminal law administration’s most significant problems 
in ways importantly distinct from (and in certain respects superior to, though not 
necessarily exclusive of) a reformist framework.  Part III addresses the preventive 
justice literature and reveals how a largely overlooked account of prevention in a 
structural register serves as an important supplement to the current body of critical 
  
65. See GLAZE & KAEBLE, supra note 6.  
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work centered on punitive preventive measures, as well as to an abolitionist 
framework.  Part IV examines how prevention in this alternative register func-
tions on the ground in a range of settings as an incipient abolitionist framework.  
Part V responds preliminarily to an anticipated retributive objection, in part 
through an account of what I will call “grounded justice.” 
I. PRISON ABOLITION 
Criminal punishment organized around incarceration in the United States, 
as well as incarceration’s corollaries (punitive policing, arrest, probation, civil 
commitment, parole), subject human beings to extreme violence, dehumaniza-
tion, racialized degradation and indignity, such that prison abolition ought to 
register as a more compelling call than it has to date.66  At the same time, the use 
of imprisonment as a means of achieving collective peace and security, as well as 
meaningful retributive justice, ought to be called into serious doubt.67  
Prison abolition seeks to end the use of punitive policing and imprisonment 
as the primary means of addressing what are essentially social, economic, and po-
litical problems.  Abolition aims at dramatically reducing reliance on incarcera-
tion and building the social institutions and conceptual frameworks that would 
render incarceration unnecessary.  Abolition is not a simple call for an immediate 
opening or tearing down of all prison walls, but entails an array of alternative 
nonpenal regulatory frameworks and an ethic that recognizes the violence, de-
humanization, and moral wrong inherent in any act of caging or chaining—or 
otherwise confining and controlling by penal force—human beings.  This holds 
true even in the case of those few people who may pose a severe, demonstrated 
danger to others and so, as the lesser of two evils, must be convicted and the 
threat they pose contained.68 
This Part explores the entrenched structural problems that recommend 
abolition, along with its theoretical, legal, and political contours and implications.  
I will first examine the violence, dehumanization, and racial subordination inher-
ent in the basic structural parameters of imprisonment and punitive policing in 
the United States that motivate the turn toward an abolitionist framework.  One 
problem with more moderate reformist accounts (of which most criminal le-
gal scholarship consists) is that they fail to identify the basic structural terms 
of punitive policing and incarceration in the U.S. that render these practices 
  
66. See COMM’N ON SAFETY & ABUSE IN AMERICA’S PRISONS, CONFRONTING CONFINEMENT 
52 (2006). 
67. See, e.g., PETTIT, supra note 7, at 9; RUSSELL SAGE FOUND., supra note 12. 
68. See supra text accompanying notes 63–64. 
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fundamentally indefensible, and instead assume that the problematic features 
of these practices are more peripheral and subject to elimination or thorough-
going change.  As a consequence, moderate reformist accounts are limited to 
recommending only minor revisions to the fundamental structures of incarcera-
tion and punitive policing practices—which are not susceptible to meaningful 
change without far more fundamental reconstitution.69  
This Part begins by mapping the structural problems and inherent dynam-
ics of penal practices that create and maintain patterns of dehumanization, vio-
lence, and racial subordination.  It will then assess an abolitionist ethic with 
reference to economic and criminological analyses of incarceration’s purported 
crime-reductive effects.   
A. Violence and Dehumanization 
Prisons are places of intense brutality, violence, and dehumanization.70  In 
his seminal study of the New Jersey State Prison, The Society of Captives, sociolo-
gist Gresham M. Sykes carefully exposed how the fundamental structure of the 
modern U.S. prison degrades the inmate’s basic humanity and sense of self-
worth.71  Caged or confined and stripped of his freedom, the prisoner is forced to 
submit to an existence without the ability to exercise the basic capacities that de-
fine personhood in a liberal society.72  The inmate’s movement is tightly con-
trolled, sometimes by chains and shackles, and always by orders backed with the 
threat of force;73 his body is subject to invasive cavity searches on command;74 he 
is denied nearly all personal possessions; his routines of eating, sleeping, and 
bodily maintenance are minutely managed; he may communicate and interact 
  
69. See NAOMI MURAKAWA, THE FIRST CIVIL RIGHT: HOW LIBERALS BUILT PRISON 
AMERICA 154 (2014) (“Administrative tinkering does not confront the damning features of the 
American carceral state, its scale and its racial concentration . . . Without a normatively grounded 
understanding of racial violence, liberal reforms will do the administrative shuffle.”). 
70. See COMM’N ON SAFETY & ABUSE IN AMERICA’S PRISONS, supra note 66, at 52. 
71. See GRESHAM M. SYKES, THE SOCIETY OF CAPTIVES: A STUDY OF A MAXIMUM SECURITY 
PRISON 79 (Princeton Univ. Press 2007) (1958). 
72. See id. 
73. See Maryland General Assembly Status Report 2013, WASH. POST, http://apps.washingtonpost.com/ 
g/page/local/maryland-general-assembly-status-report-2013/88 (last updated Apr. 9, 12:01 AM) 
(reporting Maryland House Bill 829, which would discourage shackling of pregnant inmates 
during childbirth, died in committee). 
74. See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1525 (2012) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting) (upholding as reasonable under the Fourth Amendment a search upon admission to 
jail of a person mistakenly arrested that included “spreading and/or lifting his testicles to expose 
the area behind them and bending over and/or spreading the cheeks of his buttocks to expose his 
anus”) (quoting Dodge v. Cnty. of Orange, 282 F. Supp. 2d 41, 46 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)). 
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with others only on limited terms strictly dictated by his jailers; and he is reduced 
to an identifying number, deprived of all that constitutes his individuality.75  
Sykes’s account of “the pains of imprisonment”76 attends not only to the dehu-
manizing effects of this basic structure of imprisonment—which remains rela-
tively unchanged from the New Jersey penitentiary of 1958 to the U.S. jails and 
prisons that abound today77—but also to its violent effects on the personhood of 
the prisoner: 
[H]owever painful these frustrations or deprivations may be in the 
immediate terms of thwarted goals, discomfort, boredom, and loneli-
ness, they carry a more profound hurt as a set of threats or attacks 
which are directed against the very foundations of the prisoner’s being.  
The individual’s picture of himself as a person of value . . . begins to 
waver and grow dim.78 
In addition to routines of minute bodily control, thousands of persons are 
increasingly subject to long-term and near-complete isolation in prison.  The Bu-
reau of Justice Statistics has estimated that 80,000 persons are caged in solitary 
confinement in the United States, many enduring isolation for years.79   
Solitary confinement routinely entails being locked for twenty-three to 
twenty-four hours per day in a small cell, between forty-eight and eighty square 
feet, without natural light or control of the electric light, and no view outside the 
  
75. See SYKES, supra note 71, at 78–82. 
76. Id. at 63–78. 
77. In his Introduction to the Princeton Classic Edition of The Society of Captives, sociologist Bruce 
Western explains how Sykes identifies the core structure of imprisonment such that his analysis 
remains relevant to any assessment of the experience of incarceration today—an insight Western 
arrived at in part through teaching Sykes’s classic study to a group of men incarcerated in the same 
prison Sykes’s work addressed.  Western writes: 
In the summer of 2003 I taught an undergraduate criminology class to a group of 
prisoners at New Jersey State Prison—the site of Gresham Sykes’ Society of Cap-
tives.  The obvious relevance of the case study, its beautiful writing, and classic sta-
tus all made Captives essential reading. . . . Sykes’s survey of the pains of 
imprisonment resonated with the students’ experience of incarceration. . . . Sykes’s 
work captured basic truths about penal confinement, and the field research still 
rings true. . . . The Society of Captives remains a cornerstone of prison sociology and 
indispensible for those who would understand the current era of mass incarcera-
tion.  These days, we tend to look in free society for the prison’s significance.  We 
study the prison’s effects on crime rates, or poverty, or family life.  Sykes draws us 
back inside the institution, delving into the internal logic of the prison society. 
Bruce Western, Introduction to the Princeton Classic Edition of GRESHAM M. SYKES, THE 
SOCIETY OF CAPTIVES: A STUDY OF MAXIMUM SECURITY PRISON, at ix–x (Princeton 
University Press 2007) (1958). 
78. See SYKES, supra note 71, at 79. 
79. See COMM’N ON SAFETY & ABUSE IN AMERICA’S PRISONS, supra note 66, at 52. 
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cell.80  Persons so confined may be able to spend one hour per day in a “concrete 
exercise pen,” which, although partially open to the outdoors, is typically still con-
figured as a cage.81 
Raymond Luc Levasseur, who was held in solitary confinement at the Fed-
eral Correctional Complex at Florence, Colorado, a prison devoted to solitary 
confinement (also called administrative segregation (ADX)), wrote of the first 
year of his isolation: 
Picture a cage where top, bottom, sides and back are concrete walls.  
The front is sliced by steel bars. . . .  The term “boxcar” is derived from 
this configuration: a small, enclosed box that [does not] move. . . .  
The purpose of a boxcar cell is to gouge the prisoner’s senses by sup-
pressing human sound, putting blinders about our eyes and forbidding 
touch. . . .  It seems endless.  Each morning I look at the same gray 
door and hear the same rumbles followed by long silences.  It is end-
less. . . .  I see forced feedings, cell extractions . . . .  Airborne bags of 
shit and gobs of spit become the response of the caged.  The minds of 
some prisoners are collapsing in on them. . . .  One prisoner subjected 
to four-point restraints (chains, actually) as shock therapy had been 
chewing on his own flesh.  Every seam and crack is sealed so that not a 
solitary weed will penetrate this desolation . . . .  When they’re done 
with us, we become someone else’s problem.82 
Following thirteen years of solitary confinement, Levasseur was released 
from prison in 2004.83 
The images that follow are not primarily intended to render more vivid this 
exploration of incarceration and punitive policing, but instead are incorporated to 
illustrate an important part of this Article’s argument: We must look at what these 
practices actually entail, especially because so often the ideology of criminal regula-
tion renders much of the criminal process and its violent consequences opaque or 
even invisible to us.  By removing the violent results of these regulatory approach-
es from the center of our attention, and often removing them entirely from our 
view, this same ideology persuades us of the necessity and relative harmlessness of 
incarceration and punitive policing.  An abolitionist ethic, however, requires 
us to confront what penal regulation actually involves rather than assuming 
that creating a certain spatial distance—by putting particular persons in 
  
80. See id. at 57. 
81. Id. 
82. Raymond Luc Levasseur, Trouble Coming Every Day: ADX—The First Year 1996, in THE NEW 
ABOLITIONISTS: (NEO)SLAVE NARRATIVES AND CONTEMPORARY PRISON WRITINGS 45, 
47–48 (Joy James ed., 2005). 
83. See id. at 45. 
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cages, or controlling individuals and communities through prison-backed 
police surveillance—satisfactorily addresses the social and political prob-
lems of violence, mental illness, poverty or joblessness, among others, that 
those persons and communities have come to represent. 
This photograph portrays prisoners who are suffering from mental illness 
and subject to solitary confinement in an Ohio State Prison, held in cages for a 
“group therapy” session: 
 
84 
 
These persons’ bodies are revealed in this image as objects locked in isolated small 
spaces, shackled, rendered plainly less than human. 
Cages are also used for booking mentally ill inmates in California prisons, as 
reflected in the record addressed in the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Brown 
v. Plata: 
  
84. See FRONTLINE: The New Asylums (PBS television broadcast May 10, 2005), available at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/asylums/view. 
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85 
This is a suicide watch cell, also used for isolation, in a state prison in Cali-
fornia, drawn from a related court record: 
86
In these cells, feces may be smeared on the walls as those detained mentally de-
compensate, the odor of rot and acute despair palpable.87 
  
85. See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1949–50 app. B–C (2011); see also Dave Gilson, Slideshow: 
California’s Jam-Packed Prisons, MOTHER JONES, http://www.motherjones.com/ 
slideshows/2011/05/california-prison-overcrowding-photos/holding-cages (last visited Apr. 11, 
2015) (describing and displaying images from the record in Brown v. Plata not incorporated in the 
Court’s opinion). 
86. See sources cited supra note 85. 
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As incarcerated populations have increased, solitary confinement has 
emerged as a primary mechanism for internal jail and prison discipline, such that 
the actual number of individuals confined to a small cell for twenty-three hours 
per day remains unknown and may be significantly in excess of 80,000.88  Some 
people are sentenced to “Super-Max” facilities that only contain solitary cells; 
other people are placed in solitary confinement as punishment for violating pris-
on rules or for their own protection. 
Stays in solitary confinement are often lengthy, even for relatively minor 
disciplinary rule violations, and may be indefinite.  For example, one young pris-
oner caught with seventeen packs of Newport cigarettes was sentenced to fifteen 
days solitary confinement for each pack of cigarettes, totaling more than eight 
months of solitary confinement.89  Another prisoner in New Jersey spent 
eighteen years in solitary confinement.  Although his solitary confinement sta-
tus was subject to review every ninety days, this prisoner explained that he eventu-
ally stopped participating in the reviews as he felt they were “a sham, with no real 
investigation,” and lost hope that he would ever be able to leave.90 
Solitary confinement has become a widely tolerated and “regular part of the 
rhythm of prison life,”91 yet this basic structure of prison discipline in the United 
States entails profound violence and dehumanization; indeed, solitary confine-
ment produces effects similar to physical torture.  Psychiatrist Stuart Grassian 
first introduced to the psychiatric and medical community in the early 1980s 
that prisoners living in isolation suffered a constellation of symptoms including 
overwhelming anxiety, confusion, hallucinations, and sudden violent and self-
destructive outbursts.92  This pattern of debilitating symptoms, sufficiently 
consistent among persons subject to solitary confinement (otherwise known as 
  
87. See A Tour of East Mississippi Correctional Center, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/prisoners-
rights/tour-east-mississippi-correctional-facility (last visited Apr. 11, 2015); see also Erica Goode, 
Seeing Squalor and Unconcern in a Mississippi Jail, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/08/us/seeing-squalor-and-unconcern-in-southern-jail.html 
(“Open fires sometimes burn unheeded in the solitary-confinement units of the East Mississippi 
Correctional Facility, a privately run state prison in Meridian. . . . Inmates spend months in near-
total darkness.  Illnesses go untreated.  Dirt, feces and, occasionally, blood are caked on the walls 
of cells.”). 
88. Solitary confinement is used daily in immigration detention and local jails around the United 
States.  See COMM’N ON SAFETY & ABUSE IN AMERICA’S PRISONS, supra note 66, at 53 
(“[T]he growth rate in of the number of prisoners housed in segregation far outpaced the growth 
rate of the overall prison population . . . .”). 
89. See id. at 54. 
90. Id. at 55. 
91. Id. at 53. 
92. See Stuart Grassian, Psychopathological Effects of Solitary Confinement, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 
1450 (1983). 
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the Special Housing Unit (SHU)), gave rise to the designation of SHU Syn-
drome.93 
Partly on this basis, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture has 
found that certain U.S. practices of solitary confinement violate the U.N. Con-
vention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Punish-
ment.94  Numerous psychiatric studies likewise corroborate that solitary 
confinement produces effects tantamount to torture.95  Bonnie Kerness, Associ-
ate Director of the American Friends Service Committee’s Prison Watch, testi-
fied before the Commission on Safety and Abuse in America’s Prisons that while 
visiting prisoners in solitary confinement, she spoke repeatedly “with people who 
begin to cut themselves, just so they can feel something.”96  Soldiers who are cap-
tured in war and subjected to solitary confinement and severe physical abuse also 
report the suffering of isolation to be as awful as, and even worse than, physical 
torture.97 
But despite its more apparent horrors, solitary confinement is simply an ex-
tension of the logic and basic structure of prison-backed punishment—punitive 
isolation and surveillance—to the disciplinary regime of the prison itself.  Solitary 
confinement’s justification and presumed efficacy flows from the assumed legiti-
macy of prison confinement in the first instance.  Prison or jail confinement 
  
93. See id. 
94. See Terri Judd, UN Advisor Says Sending Muslim Cleric Abu Hamza to US Would Equal Torture, 
INDEP. (Oct. 3, 2012), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/un-advisor-says-
sending-muslim-cleric-abu-hamza-to-us-would-equal-torture-8194857.html. 
95. See, e.g., TERRY KUPERS, PRISON MADNESS: THE MENTAL HEALTH CRISIS BEHIND BARS 
AND WHAT WE MUST DO ABOUT IT (1999); LORNA A. RHODES, TOTAL CONFINEMENT: 
MADNESS AND REASON IN THE MAXIMUM SECURITY PRISON (2004); Craig Haney, Mental 
Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary and “Super-Max” Confinement, 49 CRIME & DELINQ. 124 
(2003); Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, Regulating Prisons of the Future: A Psychological Analysis of 
Supermax and Solitary Confinement, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 477 (1997); see also 
Commonwealth of Pa. H.R., H. Democratic Policy Comm. Hearing, at 9 (2012) (stating that 
according to Psychiatrist Terry Kupers “most inmates in solitary confinement are released into 
society and emerge mentally destroyed and full of rage”). 
96. COMM’N ON SAFETY & ABUSE IN AMERICA’S PRISONS, supra note 66, at 58. 
97. Physician and Professor of Public Health Atul Gawande describes in his powerful essay, Hellhole, 
focused on solitary confinement, how Senator John McCain experienced his time in solitary 
confinement as a prisoner of war in Vietnam as, in McCain’s own words, “an awful thing . . . . It 
crushes your spirit and weakens your resistance more effectively than any other form of 
mistreatment.”  Gawande clarifies that this statement of relative suffering “comes from a man who 
was beaten regularly; denied adequate medical treatment for two broken arms, a broken leg, and 
chronic dysentery; and tortured to the point of having an arm broken again.”  A U.S. military 
study of more than 150 naval aviators imprisoned during the Vietnam War, some of whom 
endured physical abuses even worse than those suffered by McCain, revealed that these persons 
too felt solitary confinement to be more or equivalently torturous to any physical agony they 
endured.  Atul Gawande, Hellhole, NEW YORKER, Mar. 30, 2009, at 36. 
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isolates the detained individual from the social world he inhabited previous-
ly, stripping that person of his capacity to move of his own volition, to inter-
act with others, and to exercise control over the details of his own life.  Once 
that initial form of confinement and deprivation of basic control over one’s own 
life is understood to be legitimate, solitary confinement merely applies the same 
approach to discipline within prison walls.  But the basic physical isolation and 
confinement is already countenanced by the initial incarceration. 
In addition to the dehumanization entailed by the regular and pervasive role 
of solitary confinement in U.S. jails, prisons, and other detention centers, the en-
vironment of prison itself is productive of further violence as prisoners seek to 
dominate and control each other to improve their relative social position through 
assault, sexual abuse, and rape.  This feature of rampant violence, presaged by 
Sykes’s account, arises from the basic structure of prison society, from the fact 
that the threat of physical force imposed by prison guards cannot adequately en-
sure order in an environment in which persons are confined against their will, 
held captive, and feared by their custodians.98  Consequently, order is produced 
through an implicitly sanctioned regime of struggle and control between 
prisoners.99 
Rape, in particular, is rampant in U.S. jails and prisons.100  According to a 
conservative estimate by the U.S. Department of Justice, 13 percent of prison in-
mates have been sexually assaulted in prison, with many suffering repeated sexual 
assaults.101  While noting that “the prevalence of sexual abuse in America’s in-
mate confinement facilities is a problem of substantial magnitude,” the Depart-
ment of Justice acknowledged that “in all likelihood the institution-reported data 
significantly undercounts the number of actual sexual abuse victims in prison, due 
to the phenomenon of underreporting.”102  Although the Department had previ-
ously recorded 935 instances of confirmed sexual abuse for 2008, further analysis 
produced a figure of 216,000 victims that year (victims, not incidents).103  These 
figures suggest an endemic problem of sexual violence in U.S. prisons and jails 
  
98. See SYKES, supra note 71, at 42–46. 
99. See id.  
100. See, e.g., Christopher Glazek, Raise the Crime Rate, 13 N+1 5 (2012); see also Sharon Dolovich, 
Strategic Segregation in the Modern Prison, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2011) (discussing the 
acute problems for LGBTQ prisoners and others vulnerable to sexual victimization behind bars). 
101. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Docket No. OAG-131, RIN 1105-AB34, PROPOSED NATIONAL 
STANDARDS TO PREVENT, DETECT, AND RESPOND TO PRISON RAPE UNDER THE PRISON 
RAPE ELIMINATION ACT (PREA), at 4 (Jan. 24, 2011) (“The total number of inmates who have 
been sexually assaulted in the past twenty years likely exceeds 1,000,000.”). 
102. Id. at 4, 6. 
103. See Glazek, supra note 100, at 5. 
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produced by the structure of carceral confinement and the dynamics that inhere 
in prison settings. 
In one notable case that makes vivid these underlying dynamics, Roderick 
Johnson sued seven Texas prison officials for failing to protect him from victimi-
zation by prison gang members who raped him hundreds of times and sold him 
between rival gangs for sex over the course of eighteen months.104  Johnson, a gay 
man who had struggled with drug addiction, was incarcerated for probation vio-
lations following a burglary conviction.105  Rape was so prevalent in the facility 
where Johnson was incarcerated that it had a relatively fixed price: A former pris-
oner witness explained to the judge and jury at the trial that a purchased rape in 
that prison cost between $3 and $7.106  When Johnson sought protection from 
prison officials, he was told he would have to “fight or fuck.”107 
Seeking to avoid liability at trial, one of the prison official defendants, Jim-
my Bowman, explained that prison officials were not responsible for failing to 
protect Johnson because “an inmate has to defend himself.”108  Richard E. 
Wathen, the assistant warden, conceded that “[p]rison . . . is a violent place,” but 
he testified that prison officials ought not to be held accountable under the 
Eighth Amendment for repeated gang rapes of prisoners if there was little offi-
cials could have done to prevent the abuse: “I believe that we did the right thing 
then, and I would make the same decision today. . . .  There has to be some ex-
treme threat before we put an offender in safekeeping.”109 
In any event, safekeeping in many detention settings only amounts to soli-
tary confinement.  And though prisoners are less likely to be subject to rape if 
they are held in relative isolation for their own protection, they are likely to suffer 
other substantial psychological harm, as previously noted.110  Ultimately, Johnson 
lost his civil case as the jury found for the prison officials.111  After his trial, John-
son relapsed in his addiction recovery, reoffended by attempting to steal money 
  
104. See Adam Liptak, Inmate Was Considered ‘Property’ of Gang, Witness Tells Jury in Prison Rape 
Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/25/national/25rape. 
html?_r=0. 
105. See id. 
106. See id. 
107. Glazek, supra note 100, at 4. 
108. Liptak, supra note 104. 
109. Id. (quoting Richard E. Wathen) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
110. See, e.g., Ian Urbina & Catherine Rentz, Immigrants Held in Solitary Cells, Often for Weeks, N.Y. 
TIMES (March 23, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/24/us/immigrants-held-in-solitary-
cells-often-for-weeks.html (reporting that detainees, including those in civil immigration 
detention, are routinely placed in solitary confinement “for protective purposes when the 
immigrant was gay,” and that “[f]ederal officials confined Delfino Quiroz, a gay immigrant from 
Mexico, in solitary for four months in 2010, saying it was for his own protection”). 
111. See Johnson v. Texas, 257 S.W.3d 778 (Tex. App. 2008). 
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(presumably to buy drugs), and returned to serve out a further nineteen-year pris-
on sentence.112 
These horrific experiences of incarceration are not simply outlier forms 
of dehumanization and violence, but are produced by the structure of U.S. 
imprisonment—by the basic manner in which caging or confining human be-
ings strips individuals of their personhood and humanity, and sets in motion 
dynamics of domination and subordination.  In research widely known as the 
Stanford Prison Experiment, psychologists Philip Zimbardo and Craig Haney 
further elucidated these structural dynamics.113  Notwithstanding subsequent 
criticism, their experiment revealed how the basic structure of the prison in the 
United States tends toward dehumanization and violence.114  At the outset of 
their now famous (or infamous) experiment, Zimbardo and Haney placed a 
group of typical college students into a simulated prison environment on Stanford 
University’s campus.115  Zimbardo and Haney randomly designated certain of the 
students as mock-prisoners and others as mock-guards.116  What happened in the 
course of the six days that followed shocked the researchers, professional col-
leagues, and the general public.117  Zimbardo and Haney found that their “‘institu-
tion’ rapidly developed sufficient power to bind and twist human behavior . . . .”118  
Mock-guards engaged with prisoners in a manner that was “negative, hostile, af-
  
112. See id.; see also Michael Rigby, Sexually Abused Texas Prisoner Loses Federal Lawsuit, Returns to 
Prison, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (Sept. 15, 2006), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/ 
2006/sep/15/sexually-abused-texas-prisoner-loses-federal-lawsuit-returns-to-prison. 
113. See Craig Haney & Philip Zimbardo, The Past and Future of U.S. Prison Policy: Twenty-Five Years 
After the Stanford Prison Experiment, 53 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 709, 709 (1998). 
114. See id.; see also infra notes 117–122 and accompanying text (discussing subsequent criticism of the 
Stanford Prison Experiment). 
115. See Haney & Zimbardo, supra note 113, at 709. 
116. See id. 
117. The authors reflected on the experiment: 
Otherwise emotionally strong college students who were randomly assigned to be 
mock-prisoners suffered acute psychological trauma and breakdowns.  Some of the 
students begged to be released from the intense pains of less than a week of merely 
simulated imprisonment, whereas others adapted by becoming blindly obedient to 
the unjust authority of the guards.  The guards, too . . . quickly internalized their 
randomly assigned role.  Many of these seemingly gentle and caring young men, 
some of whom had described themselves as pacifists or Vietnam War “doves,” soon 
began mistreating their peers and were indifferent to the obvious suffering that 
their actions produced.  Several of them devised sadistically inventive ways to har-
ass and degrade the prisoners, and none of the less actively cruel mock-guards ever 
intervened or complained about the abuses they witnessed. . . . [The] planned two-
week experiment had to be aborted after only six days because the experience 
dramatically and painfully transformed most of the participants in ways we did 
not anticipate, prepare for, or predict. 
Id.  
118. Id. at 710. 
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frontive, and dehumanizing,” despite the fact that the “guards and prisoners were 
essentially free to engage in any form of interaction.”119  “[V]erbal interactions 
were pervaded by threats, insults and deindividuating references . . . . The nega-
tive, anti-social reactions observed were not the product of an environment creat-
ed by combining a collection of deviant personalities, but rather the result of an 
intrinsically pathological situation which could distort and rechannel the behavior 
of essentially normal individuals.”120 
The Stanford Prison Study has been criticized for methodological, ethical, 
and other shortcomings, but, despite its limitations, it attests to the dehumaniz-
ing dynamics that routinely surface in carceral settings.121  According to some 
critics, for instance, the Stanford Prison Study reflects the participants’ obedience 
and conformity to stereotypic behavior associated with prisoners and guards, ra-
ther than an effect produced exclusively and directly by the institutional environ-
ment of prisons.122  But even if the study’s critics are correct, it remains true that 
these same features of conformity and behavioral expectations obtain in actual 
prison environments.  Therefore, whether the Stanford Prison Study measures 
institutional effects or the tendency of people in such institutional settings to con-
form to widely understood behavioral expectations associated with such settings, 
it is still the case that these settings will tend to reproduce powerful dynamics of 
dominance, subordination, dehumanization, and violence. 
Of separate though equal concern, the violence and dehumanization of in-
carceration not only shapes those who are incarcerated, but produces destructive 
consequences for entire communities.123  People leaving prison are marked by 
the experience of incarceration in ways that makes the world outside prison 
more violent and insecure; it becomes harder to find employment and to engage 
  
119. Id. 
120. Id. 
121. The primary criticism leveled against the study is that what the principal investigator Zimbardo 
primarily measured was not, as he claimed, the impact of prisons as an institution in producing 
cruelty, but rather the already engrained expectations study participants had about how persons in 
prison behave, as well as their desire to please him and follow his implicit instruction to mimic the 
comportment of prisoners and prison guards.  See, e.g., Ali Banuazizi & Siamak Movahedi, 
Interpersonal Dynamics in a Simulated Prison: A Methodological Analysis, 30 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 
152 (1975); Carlo Prescott, Op-Ed., The Lie of the Stanford Prison Experiment, STAN. DAILY, 
Apr. 28, 2005, at 4. 
122. See, e.g., Banuazizi & Movahedi, supra note 121. 
123. See Adriaan Lanni, The Future of Community Justice, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 359, 389 
(2005) (“The severity of the current sentencing regime has devastating effects on high-crime 
communities, including reduced employment opportunities, financial hardship, disruption 
suffered by the offender’s family and children, and the erosion of social capital and organization 
resulting from the aggregation of these effects over the community.”). 
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in collective social life because of the stigma of criminal conviction.124  Further, 
incarcerating individuals has harmful effects on their families.  The children, par-
ents, and neighbors of prisoners suffer while their mothers, fathers, children, and 
community members are confined.125  Coming of age with a parent incarcerated 
generally has a substantial and negative impact on the life chances of young 
people.126 
It is insufficient to simply seek to reform the most egregious instances of 
violence and abuse that occur in prison while retaining a commitment to prison-
backed criminal law enforcement as a primary social regulatory framework.  Of 
course, less violence in these places would undoubtedly render prisons more hab-
itable, but the degradation associated with incarceration in the United States is at 
the heart of the structure of imprisonment elucidated decades ago by Sykes: Im-
prisonment in its basic structure entails caging or imposed physical constriction, 
minute control of prisoners’ bodies and most intimate experiences, profound de-
personalization, and institutional dynamics that tend strongly toward violence.  
These dehumanizing aspects of incarceration are unlikely to be meaningfully 
eliminated in the U.S., following decades of failed efforts to that end, while re-
taining a commitment to the practice of imprisonment.  This is especially so in 
the United States for reasons related to the specific historical and racially subor-
dinating legacies of American incarceration and punitive policing.  Two hundred 
and forty years of slavery and ninety years of legalized segregation, enforced in 
large measure through criminal law administration, render U.S. carceral and 
punitive policing practices less amenable to the reforms undertaken, for exam-
ple, in Scandinavian countries, which have more substantially humanized their 
prisons.127   
  
124. See Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Costs of Mass Incarceration in African-American 
Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1281 (2004) (“There is a social dynamic that aggravates 
and augments the negative consequences to individual inmates when they come from and return 
to particular neighborhoods in concentrated numbers.”). 
125. See id. at 1284 (“Separation from imprisoned parents has serious psychological consequences for 
children, including depression, anxiety, feelings of rejection, shame, anger, and guilt, and 
problems in school.”).  
126. See DONALD BRAMAN, DOING TIME ON THE OUTSIDE: INCARCERATION AND FAMILY 
LIFE IN URBAN AMERICA (2004) (examining the stigma, shame, and hardship experienced by 
children of incarcerated parents).  
127. See, e.g., Allegra M. McLeod, Confronting Criminal Law’s Violence: The Possibilities of Unfinished 
Alternatives, 8 HARV. UNBOUND 109, 122 (2013) (discussing the Scandinavian prisoners’ welfare 
movement, convened in part around a “Parliament of Thieves,” which included furloughed 
prisoners along with criminologists and other experts, and which ultimately organized to 
substantially transform the conditions in prisons in Norway, Sweden and Denmark). 
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The following Subpart addresses the racial dynamics associated with incar-
ceration and punitive policing in the United States and the practices of racial de-
humanization through which U.S. carceral and policing institutions developed. 
B. Racial Subordination and the Penal State 
Alongside imprisonment’s general structural brutality, abolition merits fur-
ther consideration as an ethical framework because of the racial subordination in-
herent in both historical and contemporary practices of incarceration and punitive 
policing.  Michelle Alexander’s The New Jim Crow popularized a critique of in-
carceration as a means of racialized social control in the United States, but Alex-
ander’s account was preceded and accompanied by earlier historical, 
psychological, literary, and sociological studies focused on how maintaining social 
order through incarceration emerged as a way to preserve the power relationships 
inherent in slavery and Jim Crow; these studies further demonstrate how punitive 
policing and imprisonment continue to be haunted at their very core by a dehu-
manizing inheritance of racialized violence.128  These various accounts elucidate 
how in the immediate aftermath of the Civil War the ascription of criminal 
status—leading to the classification and separation of citizens and the curtail-
ment of their rights of citizenship—served as an instance of the process Reva 
Siegel has called “preservation through transformation,” defined as the evolu-
tion of a mode of status-enforcing state action in response to contestation of the 
status’ earlier manifestations (in this case, chattel slavery and later de jure racial 
segregation).129  Because this history of slavery and Jim Crow’s afterlife in crimi-
nal punishment practices is already addressed elsewhere, here I will only briefly 
  
128. See ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 20–22. 
129. See Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J., 
2117, 2118–20 (1996); Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms 
of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111 (1997).  Preservation through 
transformation does not entail simply that one status regime persist through time in an identical 
state; to locate a subordinating institution preserved though transformed is not to identify two 
absolutely equivalent entities.  Disproportionate minority confinement (or hyper-incarceration, to 
invoke Loïc Wacquant’s term) and slavery are not equivalent practices, just as wife battering 
protections and marital privacy prerogatives are not equivalent.  See Loïc Wacquant, Class, Race & 
Hyperincarceration in Revanchist America, DÆDALUS, Summer 2010, at 74.  Instead, the older 
systems of status privilege are translated and transposed into a new historical period in accord with 
a less controversial social idiom but in a manner that effectively protects prior subordinating 
relationships.  See COLIN DAYAN, THE LAW IS A WHITE DOG: HOW LEGAL RITUALS 
MAKE AND UNMAKE PERSONS (2011) (exploring how the legacies of past forms of violence and 
subordination create unacknowledged but pervasive effects in the present); SAIDIYA V. 
HARTMAN, SCENES OF SUBJECTION: TERROR, SLAVERY, AND SELF-MAKING IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1997) (same); PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY 
OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991) (same). 
1186 62 UCLA L. REV. 1156 (2015) 
examine the racially subordinating structure of punitive policing and imprison-
ment insofar as it is relevant to an abolitionist framework and ethic.130 
The significance of this material from an abolitionist standpoint is that it 
further underscores the constitutive role of degradation in core U.S. incarceration 
and punitive policing structures, as they fail to treat targeted persons as fully hu-
man and thus deserving of equal dignity and regard.  Understanding practices of 
punitive policing and imprisonment as a legal and political technology developed, 
in large part, both through and for degradation and racial subordination calls for 
greater scrutiny of these techniques.  In particular, critical analysis must attend to 
whether the purported ambitions of these techniques are meaningfully achieved 
and separable so as to disconnect the present applications of punitive policing and 
incarceration from their brutal racialized pasts.  In this Subpart, I argue that the 
racial legacies of incarceration and punitive policing infect these practices to their 
core by shaping the tolerated range of violence in criminal law enforcement con-
texts, as well as by coloring basic perceptions of and ideas about criminality and 
threat. 
The racialized dimensions of punitive policing and incarceration are not, of 
course, merely historical; they are vividly present in, among other places, the con-
tinued killings of African American men by white police officers.131  As recently 
  
130. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 7; HARTMAN, supra note 129; Wacquant, supra note 129. 
131. See, e.g., Nusrat Choudhury, Ferguson Is Everytown U.S.A., HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 18, 2014, 
7:41 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nusrat-choudhury/ferguson-is-everytown-
usa_b_5689547.html (reporting the alarming frequency with which police kill unarmed African 
American men in the United States and examining a spate of such killings in the summer of 
2014); Mark Govaki, Family of Man Shot at Walmart Wants Answers, Surveillance Video, DAYTON 
DAILY NEWS (Aug. 11, 2014, 6:49 PM), http://www.daytondailynews.com/news/news/crime-
law/family-of-man-shot-at-walmart-wants-answers-survei/ngzT4 (reporting on police killing in 
Beavercreek, Ohio, of John Crawford III, an African American man, in a Walmart who was 
holding a BB gun he picked up on a store shelf); Scott Martelle, Why Don’t We Know How Often a 
Michael Brown Is Killed by Police?, Op-Ed., L.A. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2014, 12:28 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/opinion-la/la-ol-ferguson-police-killing-african-americans-
20140819-story.html (describing the killing of Michael Brown, an unarmed African American 
teenager, who was gunned down in the street in broad daylight in Ferguson, Missouri, by a police 
officer, with multiple shots fired through the young man’s body and head); John A. Moreno, et 
al., Police Fatally Shoot Man in South L.A.; Family Members Say He Was Lying Down When Shot, 
KTLA 5 (Aug. 12, 2014, 5:01 AM), http://ktla.com/2014/08/12/man-hospitalized-after-being-
shot-by-police-in-south-l-a (describing the police killing of Ezell Ford, an African American 
man, who was shot by Los Angeles police during an investigative stop, during which, as his 
mother reported, he was lying on the ground complying with officers’ orders when the officer shot 
him three times in the back); Ken Murray et al., Staten Island Man Dies After NYPD Cop Puts Him 
in Chokehold, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (July 17, 2014, 10:41 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-
york/staten-island-man-dies-puts-choke-hold-article-1.1871486 (reporting on the killing by 
police of Eric Garner, an African American man, who died because New York police placed him 
in a chokehold, a prohibited arrest technique, and rammed his head into a sidewalk when taking 
him into custody for allegedly selling illegal cigarettes); Jeremy Ross & Katie Delong, Witness 
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as the 1990s, some Los Angeles police officers referred to cases involving young 
African American men as “N.H.I.” cases, standing for “no humans involved.”132  
In 2003, after a Las Vegas police officer shot and killed a black man named Or-
lando Barlow, who was on his knees, unarmed, and attempting to surrender, an 
investigative series by the Las Vegas Review-Journal revealed that the officers in 
the unit celebrated the shooting by ordering t-shirts portraying the officer’s gun 
“and the initials B.D.R.T. (Baby’s Daddy Removal Team)—a racially charged 
term and reference to Barlow, who was watching his girlfriend’s children before 
he was shot.”133  The acronym B.D.R.T. continues to circulate in police culture, 
as do the associated racially subordinating associations directed at African Ameri-
can men.  For example, online stores that sell police-themed clothing continue to 
market B.D.R.T. t-shirts, and, in 2011, officers with the Panama City, Florida, 
Police Department adopted the acronym for their kickball police league team.134  
Whereas Alexander argues the legacy and persistence of these dynamics require a 
social movement to markedly reduce incarceration and disproportionate minority 
confinement, my analysis entails in addition (or instead) that the structural char-
acter of these racial legacies requires a movement committed to the thoroughgo-
ing replacement (and elimination) of these imprisonment and punitive policing 
practices with other social regulatory frameworks, along with a critique and rejec-
tion of many of criminal law administration’s ideological entailments.135 
  
Account of Officer-Involved Shooting Is Very Different From Police Account, FOX6NOW.COM (May 
5, 2014, 8:50 PM), http://fox6now.com/2014/05/05/witness-account-of-officer-involved-
shooting-is-very-different-from-police-account (reporting on the fatal police shooting of Dontre 
Hamilton, a 31-year-old African American man, in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, who, according to an 
eyewitness working in the area as a Starbucks barista, was killed when the officer stood ten feet 
away from Hamilton, pulled out a gun, and shot him multiple times in quick succession without 
any verbal warning). 
132. See Sylvia Wynter, No Humans Involved: An Open Letter to My Colleagues, 8 VOICES OF THE 
AFRICAN DIASPORA 13, 13 (1992). 
133. See Lawrence Mower, Troubles Follow Some Officers Who Fire Their Guns on the Job, LAS VEGAS 
REV. J. (Nov. 27, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/deadly-force/always-
justified/troubles-follow-some-officers-who-fire-their-guns-job. 
134. Amber Southard, Panama City Police Chief Upset Over Initials BDRT, WJHG.COM (Aug. 9, 
2011, 10:07 PM), http://www.wjhg.com/home/headlines/127341373.html; Radley Balko, What 
Cop T-Shirts Tell Us About Police Culture, HUFFINGTON POST (June 21, 2013, 3:00 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/21/what-cop-tshirts-tell-us-_n_3479017.html. 
135. But see Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 7, 24–26 (2011). See also 
Dorothy Roberts, Constructing a Criminal Justice System Free of Racial Bias: An Abolitionist 
Framework, 39 COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 261, 263 (2007) (exploring this same 
history and proposing “abolishing criminal justice institutions with direct lineage to slavery and 
Jim Crow. . . . The only explanation for the endurance of these barbaric practices is their racist 
function and the only moral remedy is their abolition.”).  Although Roberts frames her account as 
abolitionist it seeks the elimination only of particular practices of carceral punishment tied to 
slavery and Jim Crow. As she explains, “The goals . . . would be: to drastically reduce the prison 
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* * * 
The racialized constitution of imprisonment and punitive policing began in 
the South even before the Civil War, though in the pre–Civil War period the rel-
atively small population of Southern prison inmates were primarily white, as most 
African Americans were held in slavery.136  Although the legal institution of slav-
ery was abolished with the end of the Civil War, the work necessary to incorpo-
rate former slaves as political, economic, and social equals was neglected, and in 
many instances actively resisted.137  In particular, criminal law enforcement func-
tioned as the primary mechanism for the continued subordination of African 
Americans for profit.138  During Reconstruction, Southern legislatures sought to 
maintain control of freed slaves by passing criminal laws directed exclusively at 
African Americans.139  These laws treated petty crimes as serious offenses and 
criminalized certain previously permissible activities, but only for the “free ne-
gro.”140  Specific criminalized offenses included “mischief,” “insulting gestures,” 
“cruel treatment to animals,” “cohabitating with whites,” “keeping firearms,” and 
the “vending of spirituous or intoxicating liquors.”141  
These “Black Codes” were adopted by legislatures in Alabama, Florida, 
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Texas.142  These laws 
quickly expanded Southern inmate populations and transformed them from pre-
dominantly white to predominately African American.143  Convict leasing was 
exempted from the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition on slavery, which out-
lawed involuntary servitude except in the case of those “duly convicted.”144  
  
population by seeking state and federal moratoriums on new prison constructions, amnesty for 
most prisoners convicted of nonviolent crimes, and repeal of excessive, mandatory sentences for 
drug offenses; to abolish capital punishment; and to implement new procedures to identify and 
punish police abuse.”  See id. at 284. 
136. See DAVID M. OSHINSKY, “WORSE THAN SLAVERY”: PARCHMAN FARM AND THE ORDEAL 
OF JIM CROW JUSTICE 6, 7 (1996) (explaining how before the Civil War criminal punishment 
was intended primarily for whites whereas “[s]laves were the property of their master, and the state 
did not normally intervene” and noting Mississippi’s early convict population “was 
overwhelmingly white and male, reflecting a society in which slaves were punished by the master 
and white women were seen as ‘virtuous’ and ‘pure’”). 
137. See W.E.B. DU BOIS, supra note 19 (examining how the “criminal system came to be used as a 
method” for keeping African Americans “at work and intimidating them”). 
138. See id. 
139. See OSHINKSY, supra note 136, at 20–21. 
140. See id. at 21. 
141. See id. 
142. See id.  For a brief history of racial bias in the drafting of criminal statutes, see District Judge 
Cahill’s opinion in United States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp. 768, 774 (E.D. Mo. 1994). 
143. See OSHINKSY, supra note 136, at 34 (“Almost overnight, the jail-house had become a‘negro 
preserve.’”). 
144. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. 
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Criminal law enforcement was then used to return African Americans to the 
same plantations on which they had labored as slaves, as well as to condemn 
thousands to convict leasing operations, chain gangs, and prison plantations.145 
Even before the Civil War, penitentiaries in the North contained a dispro-
portionate number of African Americans, many of them former slaves.146  New 
York legislated the emancipation of slaves and the founding of the state’s first 
prison on the same date in 1796.147  In Alexis de Tocqueville’s and Gustave de 
Beaumont’s  classic 1883 account, On the Penitentiary System in the United States 
and Its Application in France, the two wrote: “[I]n those [Northern] states in 
which there exists one Negro to thirty whites, the prisons contain one Negro to 
four white persons.”148 
There are many similarities in form between slavery and the early Northern 
penitentiaries.  Both subordinated their subjects to the will of others, and South-
ern slaves and inmates alike followed a daily routine dictated by white superi-
ors.149  Both forced their subjects to rely on whites for the fulfillment of their basic 
needs for food, water, and shelter.  Both isolated them in a surveilled environ-
ment.  The two institutions also frequently forced their subjects to work for long-
er hours and less compensation than free laborers.150  Although the basic 
structure of Northern prisons that purported to rehabilitate through a routine of 
solitude and discipline may seem at first blush quite removed from the dehuman-
izing and violent dynamics that characterized the Southern convict experience, 
one dehumanizing feature remained markedly constant: Even in rehabilitative 
contexts in the North, the penitentiary aimed to strip and degrade the inmate of 
his former self so as to reconstitute his being according to the institution’s pre-
ferred terms.  And as commentators, such as Charles Dickens, noted at the time, 
  
145. See OSHINKSY, supra note 136, at 21, 33–34, 37, 40–41. 
146. See THOMAS EDDY, AN ACCOUNT OF THE STATE PRISON OR PENITENTIARY HOUSE IN 
THE CITY OF NEW YORK (1801); JAMES MEASE, OBSERVATIONS ON THE PENITENTIARY 
SYSTEM AND PENAL CODE OF PENNSYLVANIA 34–36 (1828); PRISON DISCIPLINE SOC’Y, 
FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD MANAGERS 35, 36 (1826); PRISON DISCIPLINE 
SOC’Y, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD MANAGERS 43–46, 79–80 (1827); 
NEGLEY K. TEETERS & JOHN D. SHEARER, THE PRISON AT PHILADELPHIA, CHERRY 
HILL: THE SEPARATE SYSTEM OF PRISON DISCIPLINE, 1829–1913, at 84 (1957); Thomas R. 
Dew, Professor Dew on Slavery, in THE PRO-SLAVERY ARGUMENT 287, 434–35 (1852). 
147. See Scott Christianson, Our Black Prisons, 27 CRIME & DELINQ. 364, 373 (1981). 
148. GUSTAVE DE BEAUMONT & ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, ON THE PENITENTIARY SYSTEM 
IN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS APPLICATION IN FRANCE 61 (Francis Lieber, trans., 1833).   
149. See Joy James, Introduction: Democracy and Captivity, in THE NEW ABOLITIONISTS, 
(NEO)SLAVE NARRATIVES AND CONTEMPORARY PRISON WRITINGS, supra note 82, at xxi, 
xxiii (“Racially fashioned enslavement shares similar features with racially fashioned 
incarceration.”). 
150. See id. 
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the “slow and daily tampering with the mysteries of the brain” entailed by this 
form of incarceration could be “immeasurably worse than any torture of the 
body.”151 
In the Reconstruction era South, whether sentences were short or long, 
convicted persons, especially African Americans, were routinely conscripted into 
vicious conditions of forced labor.152  For example, although the sentence for the 
crime of intermarriage in Mississippi was confinement in the state penitentiary 
for life, convictions were often punishable by a fine not in excess of fifty dollars.153  
If a person was unable to pay, that person could be hired out to any white man 
willing to pay the fine.154  Preference was given to the convict’s former master, 
who was permitted to withhold the amount used to pay the fine from the con-
vict’s wages.155  This common practice resulted in situations where freedmen 
would spend years, even entire lifetimes, working off their debt for a small crimi-
nal fine.156 
By contrast to this sort of peonage and criminal surety operation, the convict 
lease operated through a bidding system wherein companies would offer a set 
amount of money per day per convict, and the highest bidder would win custody 
of the group of convicts and be entitled to their labor.157  Leased convicts worked 
on farms, constructed levees, plowed fields, cleared swampland, and built train 
tracks across the South.158  They moved from work site to work site, usually in a 
rolling iron cage, which also served as their living quarters during jobs.159  Convict 
lessors justified their use of convict labor because they claimed free labor was pro-
hibitively costly; but as bidding expanded, the daily price of a convict’s labor in-
creased and free labor began to compete.160  Eventually, it was this trend toward 
parity in the cost of free and convict labor, more than any outrage at the brutal 
exploitation of the convict lease, which led to the abolition of the lease and its 
  
151. CHARLES DICKENS, AMERICAN NOTES FOR GENERAL CIRCULATION 43 (Penguin Books 
1972) (1842). 
152. See, e.g., OSHINKSY, supra note 136, at 41–45. 
153. WILLIAM C. HARRIS, PRESIDENTIAL RECONSTRUCTION IN MISSISSIPPI (1967); JAMES 
WILFORD GARNER, RECONSTRUCTION IN MISSISSIPPI (1901). 
154. See OSHINSKY, supra note 136, at 41. 
155. See id. 
156. See id. at 60–61, 73–81. 
157. See id. at 55–65. 
158. See id. at 63–81. 
159. See, e.g., ALEX LICHTENSTEIN, TWICE THE WORK OF FREE LABOR: THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF CONVICT LABOR IN THE NEW SOUTH xvii (1996) (“[C]onvict labor in the 
South was steeped in brutality; the rawhide whip, iron shackle, sweat box, convict cage, and 
bloodhound were its most potent instruments . . . .”); OSHINSKY, supra note 136, at 59. 
160. See LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 159, at 15. 
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replacement by the chain gang.161  Chain gangs, unlike the convict lease, worked 
on maintaining public roads and performed other hard labor in the public rather 
than private sector.162 
State prisons also directly used African Americans for their labor, working 
prisoners in the fields for profit and holding them at night in wagons that were 
guarded by white men with rifles and dogs.163  Some prisons were actually con-
structed on former plantations, and consisted of vast tracts of land used for farm-
ing; white prisoners were appointed to serve as guards or trusties, assistants to the 
regular prison administrators.164  The state prison plantations could even generate 
considerable profit.  For instance, in 1917, Parchman Prison farm in Mississippi 
contributed approximately one million dollars to the state treasury through the 
sale of cotton and cotton seed, almost half of Mississippi’s entire budget for pub-
lic education that year.165  By 1917, African Americans still represented some 
ninety percent of the prison population in Mississippi.166  The most dehumaniz-
ing abuses in these various settings were directed exclusively at African Ameri-
cans.167  Southern states enacted statutes to prohibit the confinement of white 
and African American prisoners in shared quarters.  In 1903, Arkansas, for ex-
ample, passed a law declaring it “unlawful for any white prisoner to be handcuffed 
or otherwise chained or tied to a negro prisoner.”168  It is thus that the practices of 
U.S. criminal law administration were forged through the racial dehumanization 
of African American people.169 
  
161. See HARTMAN, supra note 129; LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 159, at 15. 
162. LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 159. 
163. See OSHINSKY, supra note 136, at 147–55; NICOLE HAHN RAFTER & DEBRA L. STANLEY, 
PRISONS IN AMERICA 12–13 (1999). 
164. See OSHINSKY, supra note 136, at 147–55. 
165. See id. at 155. 
166. See id. at 137. 
167. See, e.g., id. at 63 (“A black man brought in . . . was punished much more severely than a white 
man arrested for the same offense.”); id. at 124 (relating that even where criminal statutes did not 
discriminate on the basis of race, “the decision to arrest, prosecute, and sentence depended in large 
part on a person’s skin color, as did the workings of the trial itself”); id. at 149 (“Arkansas, Texas, 
Florida, and Louisiana all used the lash on their convicts . . . [as] part of the regional culture, and 
most prisoners were black.”); id. at 155 (“Parchman [Prison Farm] was a powerful link to the 
past—a place of racial discipline where blacks in striped clothing worked the cotton fields for the 
enrichment of others.”). 
168. RICHARD BARDOLPH, THE CIVIL RIGHTS RECORD: BLACK AMERICANS AND THE LAW, 
1849–1970, at 137 (1970). 
169. See JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND WIDENING 
DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE (2003).  Although Whitman does not focus on the 
importance of race in constituting the harshness of U.S. criminal punishments, he does recognize 
that U.S. criminal law administration adapted U.S. practices of leveling down rather than leveling 
up in the treatment of convicted persons. 
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Whereas the connections between slavery and the Northern penitentiary 
were further removed, the penal state in the South preserved and expanded the 
African American captive labor force and maintained racial hierarchy through ac-
tual incarceration or threat of criminal sanctions, as well as through the condi-
tions of confinement.  As recently as 1970, in Holt v. Sarver,170 a District Court in 
Arkansas upheld the brutal exploitation of working convicts (almost all of whom 
were African American), concluding that the “[Thirteenth] Amendment’s ex-
emption manifested a Congressional intent not to reach such policies and prac-
tices.”171  The awful mistreatment directed at convicted persons under the convict 
lease, chain gang, and prison plantations of the South was in these ways inextri-
cably tied to the afterlife of slavery and the failures of abolition as a positive pro-
gram of the form W.E.B. Du Bois envisioned. 
In the Northern and the Western United States, prisons were used for soli-
tary work and sought to reform inmates with a strictly controlled routine of labor 
and bible study.  Prisoners were still usually segregated by race; African Ameri-
cans were often relegated to substandard locations.172  Leasing was applied almost 
exclusively to African Americans convicted of crimes, because the Leasing Acts 
set aside prison sentences for persons serving ten or more years, and white con-
victs generally received more significant sentences because the courts rarely pun-
ished whites for less serious crimes.173  Very few whites convicted for petty 
criminal offenses were sent to prison, and when such sentencing occurred, whites 
routinely received quick pardons from the governor.174 
Beyond criminal punishment, criminal law administration was also en-
twined with practices of racial subordination through lynching.  Even in the 
North, lynch mobs would gather by the thousands outside the jailhouse or court-
house and wait until African Americans were released from pretrial detention.175  
In some cases, criminal law enforcement officials themselves actively participated 
in the lynch mobs.176   
Further instances of the direct entwinement of criminal law admin-
istration and overt racial violence abound throughout the twentieth century.  
  
170. 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970). 
171. See id. at 372. 
172. See, e.g., Loïc Wacquant, Deadly Symbiosis: When Ghetto and Prison Meet and Mesh, 3 
PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 95, 110 (2001). 
173. See OSHINSHKY, supra note 136, at 41. 
174. See id. at 264 & n.24. 
175. See, e.g., Duluth Lynching Online Resource, MINN. HIST. SOC’Y, http://collections.mnhs.org/ 
duluthlynchings/html/background.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2015). 
176. See HERBERT APTHEKER, A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE NEGRO PEOPLE IN THE 
UNITED STATES 1945–1951, at 179–82 (1993). 
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Notable examples include the Scottsboro Boys Cases of the 1930s.177  The 
Scottsboro Cases involved the hurried convictions of nine young African Ameri-
can men, all sentenced to death by white jurors.178  The limited procedural pro-
tections afforded to these young men—the mob-dominated atmosphere 
surrounding their convictions, the denial of the right to counsel until the eve of 
trial rendering any assistance necessarily ineffective, and the intentional exclusion 
of blacks from the grand and petit juries that first indicted and later convicted the 
young men179—and their challenges to the U.S. Supreme Court arguably mark 
the birth of constitutional criminal procedure.180   
This entwinement of racialized violence and the criminal process runs from 
the 1930s through the end of the twentieth century.  It is prominently illustrated 
by, among other similar episodes, the brutal torture perpetrated against countless 
African American men over two decades, from the 1970s to 1990s, by white Chi-
cago police officer John Burge and his deputies, who used suffocation, racial insults, 
burning, and electric shocks to coerce confessions, ultimately leading then-Illinois 
Governor George Ryan to commute all death sentences in the state.181 
These uses of criminal law administration as a central means of resisting the 
abolition of slavery, Reconstruction, and desegregation, continue to inform crim-
inal processes and institutions to this day by enabling forms of brutality and disre-
gard that would be unimaginable had they originated in other, more democratic, 
egalitarian, and racially integrated contexts.  As W.E.B. Du Bois predicted, this 
legacy of managing abolition and reconstruction in large part by invoking crimi-
nal law in racially subordinating ways, contrasted sharply with a different aboli-
tionist framework, one that would have incorporated freed-persons into a 
reconstituted democracy: “If the Reconstruction of the Southern states, from 
slavery to free labor, and from aristocracy to industrial democracy, had been con-
ceived as a major national program of America, whose accomplishment at any 
price was well worth the effort, we should be living today in a different world.”182  
  
177. See Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 48, 
50–52 (2000). 
178. See DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH (rev. ed. 1979). 
179. See RONALD JAY ALLEN ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: INVESTIGATION AND THE RIGHT 
TO COUNSEL 93 (2d ed. 2011). 
180. See Alan Blinder, Alabama Pardons 3 ‘Scottsboro Boys’ After 80 Years, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/22/us/with-last-3-pardons-alabama-hopes-to-put-infamous-
scottsboro-boys-case-to-rest.html. 
181. See Chris Wetterich, Ryan to Pardon 4 on Death Row, CHI. SUN TIMES (Jan. 10, 2003), 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2003-01-10/news/0301100372_1_death-row-chicago-police-
cmdr-pardons; George Ryan, Ill. Governor, Speech at Northwestern University College of Law 
(Jan. 11, 2003), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/11/national/11CND-RTEX.html. 
182. DU BOIS, supra note 19, at 633. 
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Our historical inheritance and this legacy illuminates the connection be-
tween the abolitionist path not taken in the aftermath of slavery and what 
ought to be an abolitionist ethos in reference to practices of prison-backed 
criminal regulation today. 
Instead, as the American economy underwent a shift from industrial to cor-
porate capitalism in the 1970s, resulting in the erosion of manufacturing jobs oc-
cupied by poor and working class people in the inner cities, especially African 
Americans, a distinct underclass emerged, with few options for survival other 
than low wage work, welfare dependence, or criminal activity.183  This transfor-
mation in the U.S. economy contributed substantially to the emergence of a pop-
ulation that would be permanently unemployed or underemployed.184  In turn, 
federal, state, and local governments invested greater resources in coercive mech-
anisms of social control,185  prioritizing criminal law enforcement over other so-
cial projects, such as urban revitalization and expanded social welfare and 
education spending.186 
In 1972, just before the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice 
Standards and Goals published the 1973 report noted at the beginning of this 
Article, there were 196,000 inmates in all state and federal prisons in the United 
States—a population housed in conditions that the Commission believed justi-
fied a ten year moratorium on prison construction.187  By 1997, however, the 
prison population had surged to 1,159,000188 and in 2002 there were a record 
2,166,260 people housed in U.S. prisons and jails.189 
This rapidly increasing population was characterized, as we now well know, 
by glaring racial asymmetries: As of 1989, one in four African American men were 
in criminal custody of some sort.190  In certain municipalities, the imprisonment 
  
183. See GARLAND, supra note 5, at 1–3. 
184. See Wacquant, supra note 172. 
185. See id. at 81–82; WESTERN, supra note 5, at 5, 7. 
186. See GARLAND, supra note 5, at 7 (“[T]he strong similarities that appear in the recent policies and 
practices . . . with patterns repeated across the fifty states and the federal system of the 
USA . . . are evidence of underlying patterns of structural transformation . . . brought about by a 
process of adaptation to the social conditions that now characterize these (and other) societies.”).  
This is not an account of a single factor that gave rise to an increase in incarceration but rather an 
account of the context from which hyper-incarceration emerged. 
187. See NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS & GOALS, supra note 3 
and accompanying text. 
188. See MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, RACE TO INCARCERATE 114 (1999). 
189. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2002 (2003), 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p02.pdf. 
190. See MARC MAUER & TRACEY HULING, SENTENCING PROJECT, YOUNG BLACK 
AMERICANS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: FIVE YEARS LATER 4 (1995), 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/rd_youngblack_5yrslater.pdf. 
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rates for African Americans were even more striking.  In 1991 in Washington 
D.C., 42.5 percent of young African American men were in correctional custody 
on any given day.191  In Baltimore during 1990, 56 percent of the city’s African 
American males between ages eighteen and thirty-five were either in criminal 
justice custody or wanted on warrants.192  By 2004, more than 12 percent of Afri-
can American men nationally between the ages of twenty-five to twenty-nine 
were incarcerated in prison or jail.193  Although rates of incarceration and dispro-
portionate minority confinement have declined very modestly in recent years be-
cause of fiscal crises at both the state and federal level, as well as a global decrease 
in crime, African American men remain subject to criminal confinement and ar-
rest at rates that far exceed their representation in the population.194 
Prisoners are generally no longer subjected to chain gangs or hard physical 
labor for profit, although these practices persisted in certain jurisdictions through 
the end of the twentieth century.195  Currently, another form of incarceration and 
punitive policing has emerged, one that effectuates the mass containment and ex-
ercises mass racial discipline, leading to the elimination of large numbers of poor 
and especially poor African American people from the realm of civil society.  A 
felony conviction, disproportionately meted out to African Americans, Latinos, 
and indigent whites, results in a permanent loss of voting rights in most states, 
employment bars in numerous professions, and a lifetime ban on federal student 
aid, among other damaging consequences.196  These consequences further exac-
erbate the physically segregative effects of incarceration post-release, inhibiting 
opportunities for meaningful integration available to persons and communities 
most affected by incarceration.197  These consequences of conviction constitute a 
basic denial of equal citizenship, and, as such, conviction recreates the civil death 
associated with enslavement. 
  
191. See, e.g., JONATHAN SIMON, POOR DISCIPLINE: PAROLE AND THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF 
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in several states); see also DAYAN, supra note 129, at 253 (“This book began when I saw chain 
gangs on the roads and in the prisons of Tucson Arizona in May 1995.”). 
196. See ALEXANDER, supra note 7. 
197. See WESTERN, supra note 5. 
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Further, the criminal process still operates on a for-profit model importantly 
distinct, but not entirely removed from, earlier systems of confinement for profit 
that were the direct outgrowth of slavery.198  Prisoners’ labor does not itself direct-
ly provide a significant source of profit to a lessor or single business as it once did.  
Instead, large-scale incarceration—marked by prisoners’ suffering, dehumaniza-
tion, and violence—generates a market for the construction of facilities to house 
approximately two million prisoners and jail inmates; the technology and mecha-
nisms to maintain almost seven million persons under criminal supervision; and 
the employment of thousands of prison guards, prison staff, probation and parole 
officers, and other penal professionals.199  The large sums of money poured into 
prisons and criminal surveillance have drawn major firms and a variety of Wall 
Street financiers to prison construction.200  Underwriting prison construction 
through private finance and the sale of tax-exempt bonds has served as a lucrative 
undertaking in itself.201  Though only used to manage a small portion of deten-
tion facilities, private corrections corporations, such as Corrections Corporation 
of America and Wackenhutt, submit bids to governments to manage different 
detention systems, especially immigration detention, and guarantee to provide 
these services at a lower cost than the state is able to deliver.202  Additionally, ven-
dors of everything from stand alone cells, hand and foot cuffs, razor wire, and 
shank proof vests make considerable profits from prisons.203  A single contract to 
  
198. See, e.g., Diane Cardwell, Private Businesses Fight Federal Prisons for Contracts, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
14, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/15/business/private-businesses-fight-federal-
prisons-for-contracts.html; Ian Urbina, Using Jailed Migrants as a Pool of Cheap Labor, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/25/us/using-jailed-migrants-as-a-
pool-of-cheap-labor.html. 
199. See, e.g., Gabriel Dance & Tom Meagher, U.S. Incarceration: Still Mass, MARSHALL PROJECT 
(Dec. 19, 2014, 10:08 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2014/12/19/u-s-incarceration-
still-mass (noting that in 2013 in the United States there were approximately 731,200 people 
incarcerated in jails, 1,574,700 incarcerated in prisons, and 6,899,000 people under some form of 
criminal supervision). 
200. Among them are Turner Construction, Brown and Root, and CRSS, along with architectural 
firms such as DLR Group and KMD Architects.  See GREGG BARAK, BATTLEGROUND: 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 525 (2007) (examining the structure of public and private prison finance 
during the 1990s, particularly the period between 1990 and 1995 when 213 new prisons were 
constructed); JOEL DYER, THE PERPETUAL PRISONER MACHINE: HOW AMERICA PROFITS 
FROM CRIME 13 (2000). 
201. See Finance/New Issues; California is Offering Prison and Water Bonds, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 1986), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1986/04/16/business/finance-new-issues-california-is-offering-prison-
and-water-bonds.html (“Bonds for prison construction were among the larger deals in the tax-
exempt market yesterday when California began offering $395 million of general obligation bonds 
for the purpose of financing the construction of new state prisons.”). 
202. See, e.g., Jennifer Steinhauer, Arizona May Put State Prisons in Private Hands, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
23, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/24/us/24prison.html. 
203. See DYER, supra note 200, at 14. 
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provide prisoners in the state of Texas with a soy-based meat substitute, awarded 
to VitaPro Foods, went for $34 million per year.204  The profits for phone service 
inside prison walls make food contracts seem insignificant.205 
Meanwhile, prisoners continue to serve as a captive labor force, working for 
approximately one dollar per hour, and often less.206  Numerous firms use prison-
ers as a component of their workforce in the United States, as do government en-
tities that use prison labor to manufacture products that are then sold to other 
government agencies.207  Although prisoners are no longer forced to work by or 
for the state (as they were in the South well into the twentieth century), the per-
verse profit motive that spurred the convict lease system with all its horror might 
be understood in historical context as preserved yet transformed in these various 
other guises.   
Criminal fines and fees generate substantial additional revenue for the crim-
inal process itself and for certain municipalities and other jurisdictions.208  And 
the grossly disproportionate number of African Americans imprisoned, arrested, 
criminally fined, and stopped by police further accentuates the associations be-
tween earlier forms of racialized penal subordination for profit and the contem-
porary racial dynamics of criminal law administration.209 
The deep, structural, and both conscious and unconscious entanglement of 
racial degradation and criminal law enforcement presents a strong case for aspir-
ing to abandon criminal regulatory frameworks in favor of other social regulatory 
projects, rather than aiming for more modest criminal law reform.  Multiple 
  
204. See id.  
205. See id.; Andrew Rosenthal et al., Unfair Phone Charges for Inmates, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2014) 
(reporting on exorbitant prices charged to inmates and their families for phone calls and efforts of 
the FCC to regulating unfair pricing). 
206. See Cardwell, supra note 198; NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, WORK IN 
AMERICAN PRISONS: JOINT VENTURES WITH THE PRIVATE SECTOR (1995), available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/workampr.pdf. 
207. See Cardwell, supra note 198. 
208. See, e.g., Beth A. Colgan, Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause, 102 CAL. L. REV. 277, 281 n.10 
(2014) (“The majority of individuals charged with crimes or delinquencies are assessed economic 
sanctions.”). 
209. See, e.g., Report of Jeffery Fagan, at 3–4, Floyd v. City of New York, 861 F. Supp. 2d 274 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 08 Civ. 01034 (SAS)) (finding that racial composition of a neighborhood 
predicts police stop patterns even after controlling for influences of crime, social conditions, and 
police allocation of resources); JACK MCDEVITT ET AL., RHODE ISLAND TRAFFIC STOP 
STATISTICS: DATA COLLECTION STUDY iii (Jan. 2014) (finding Rhode Island police are more 
likely to pull over people of color but less likely to give them a ticket); see also FERGUSON POLICE 
DEP’T, RACIAL PROFILING DATA (2013), https://web.archive.org/web/20140817074649/; 
http://ago.mo.gov/VehicleStops/2013/reports/161.pdf (demonstrating that African Americans 
were stopped out of proportion with their numbers in the general population, even though whites 
were far more likely to be found with contraband) (accessed by searching Internet Archive index). 
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studies have confirmed the implicit, often immediate, and at times unconscious 
associations made between African Americans, criminality, and threat.210  
These associations, borne of this history, continue to be reproduced by these 
structures and by the development of punitive policing and incarceration prac-
tices that treat certain people as not fully human.  To provide but a few exam-
ples, psychologists Jennifer Eberhardt, Philip Atiba Goff, and their collaborators 
studied how individuals in various scenarios determine who “looks like a crimi-
nal.”211  Perhaps not surprisingly, controlling for other factors, the study’s subjects 
chose people who looked African American, particularly those who looked more 
“stereotypically” African American and those coded as having more “Afro-
centric” features.212  In a similar study, psychologists Brian Lowery and Sandra 
Graham studied subjects’ responses to juvenile arrestees.  When the study’s sub-
jects were primed to understand the youth as African American, the juveniles 
were judged to be more blameworthy and deserving of harsher and more punitive 
treatment.213  Consciously expressed egalitarian racial beliefs did not significantly 
moderate the effects of implicit bias in these contexts.214 
Conscious and unconscious biases on the part of police officers often have 
lethal outcomes.  Shooter and weapons biases, for instance, are well-documented.  
In researching how subjects behave in simulated video game shooting settings, 
multiple studies have found that the likelihood of shooting a suspect who is 
armed or possesses a device other than a gun significantly increases when the sus-
pect is African American and decreases when the suspect is white.215  This is true 
  
210. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado & Daria Roithmayr, Critical Race Theory Meets Social Science, 10 
ANN. REV. LAW SOC. SCI. 149, 160–161 (2014) (discussing the cumulative effect of implicit 
biases at crucial decisionmaking stages of the criminal process, including a police officer’s decision 
to arrest, a defense lawyer’s determination to plead guilty, a prosecutor’s charging decision, a jury’s 
determination to convict, and a judge’s sentencing, and stating that “[e]ach of these decisions 
involves implicit bias at a key point in the criminal case but also interacts in a structural way with 
the preceding and subsequent decisions”). 
211. Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 876, 885–91 (2004) [hereinafter Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black]; Jennifer L. 
Eberhardt et al., Looking Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality of Black Defendants Predicts 
Capital-Sentencing Outcomes, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 383, 383–86 (2006); Philip Atiba Goff et al., Not 
Yet Human: Implicit Knowledge, Historical Dehumanization, and Contemporary Consequences, 94 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 292, 292–306 (2008). 
212. See Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black, supra note 211; Goff et al., supra note 211. 
213. See Sandra Graham & Brian S. Lowery, Priming Unconscious Racial Stereotypes About Adolescent 
Offenders, 28 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 483, 494 (2004). 
214. See id. 
215. See CHERYL STAATS ET AL., IMPLICIT BIAS REVIEW 37 (2013); Joshua Correll et al., Across the 
Thin Blue Line: Police Officers and Racial Bias in the Decision to Shoot, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 1006, 1020–22 (2007). 
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both for white and African American shooters.216  Similarly, psychologist Phil-
ip Atiba Goff and his colleagues, in a study examining archival material 
from actual death penalty cases in Pennsylvania, found that defendants de-
picted as implicitly “apelike” were more likely to be executed than those 
who were not; African Americans were more likely to be depicted as im-
plicitly “apelike” than whites.217  Judges, jurors, and prosecutors in related stud-
ies likewise reflect considerable racial bias in their determinations at numerous 
critical stages of the criminal process.218 
The landscape of contemporary criminal law enforcement is thus, in signifi-
cant and fundamental respects, part of the afterlife of slavery and Jim Crow, and 
this legacy is deeply implicated in criminal law’s persistent practices of racialized 
degradation.  Perceptions of criminality, threat, and the prevalence of violence, 
informed by these racialized material histories and dehumanizing associations, 
operate at all levels of criminal law administration, often without the relevant ac-
tors’ awareness.  This suggests something of how difficult it would be to remove 
racialized violence from prison-backed policing and imprisonment while retain-
ing these practices as a primary mechanism of maintaining social order.  The ra-
cialized degradation associated with criminal regulatory practices, then, compels 
an abolitionist ethical orientation on distinct and additional grounds apart from 
the general dehumanizing structural dynamics addressed in the preceding Sub-
part, particularly insofar as there are other available means of accomplishing 
crime-reductive objectives.   
If we are indeed committed to democratic and egalitarian values, the need to 
scrutinize closely the other purported purposes of the criminal process presses 
with increasing urgency.  So, too does the question of whether there are alterna-
tive regulatory frameworks and approaches that might achieve similar ends with 
less racially encumbered and violent consequences. 
C. The Question of Efficacy 
Beyond the violence, dehumanization, and racial subordination associated 
with incarceration and prison-backed policing, what are the other effects of im-
prisonment?  How should incarceration’s efficacy be assessed relative to these 
problems?  What, after all, is the end of imprisonment and prison-backed polic-
ing?  And how well does the prison-backed regime of criminal law enforcement 
fare in accomplishing its purported ends? 
  
216. See STAATS ET AL., supra note 215, at 38. 
217. See Goff et al., supra note 211, at 304. 
218. See STAATS ET AL., supra note 215, at 39–45. 
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To begin, determining the efficacy of imprisonment and prison-backed po-
licing is no simple matter, because the question of criminal regulation’s efficacy 
must follow two prior questions: “Efficacy at what?” and “efficacy compared to 
what?”  The assumption in the relevant economic and criminological literatures is 
generally that the only or primary relevant association is the relationship between 
incarceration rates and reported crime, or (less commonly) victimization rates.  
These comprise only one set of variables, though, among others that ought to be 
of concern.  In particular, the effect of incarceration on other measures of wel-
fare—education, democratic or civic participation, households’ ability to meet 
basic needs—is all too often neglected, as are imprisonment’s impact on racial 
and economic equality and other important social metrics.  Further, narrowly 
framing the question of incarceration’s cost-efficiency as a comparison of incarcera-
tion rates relative to crime rates, and the effort spent to measure that relationship 
with ever-increasing specificity largely ignores the complexity of incarceration’s 
myriad significant impacts, the importance of other forms of social welfare, as 
well as how reformed social arrangements might produce better, more just, and 
more meaningful welfare-enhancing and crime-reductive effects.219 
Even apart from this concern with the limited frame within which the effi-
cacy question is generally posed, the existing empirical accounts of the relation-
ship of incarceration to crime vary widely and present decidedly mixed results.  
Several studies identify no relationship between incarceration rates and crime 
rates,220 while other studies have found a crime drop of anywhere between 0.11 
percent to 22 percent associated with a 10 percent increase in incarceration, 
depending on whether national-level, state-level, county-level or other data is 
used.221  One study even identified higher crime rates associated with higher in-
carceration rates in states with relatively high rates of imprisonment.222  Conse-
  
219. Cf. Harcourt, supra note 28, at 270–71. 
220. See, e.g., Tomislav V. Kovandzic & Lynne M. Vieraitis, The Effect of County-Level Prison 
Population Growth on Crime Rates, 5 CRIME & PUB. POL’Y 213, 213 (2006); Tomislav V. 
Kovandzic et al., Unintended Consequences of Politically Popular Sentencing Policy: The Homicide 
Promoting Effects of “Three Strikes” in U.S. Cities (1980–1999), 1 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 
399 (2002); see also STEMEN, supra note 12, at 3. 
221. See, e.g., STEMEN, supra note 12, at 3; WESTERN, supra note 5, at 186–87; Joel A. Devine et al., 
Macroeconomic and Social-Control Policy Influences on Crime Rate Changes, 1984–1985, 53 AM. 
SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 407, 410, 413 (1988); Thomas B. Marvell & Carlisle E. Moody, The 
Impact of Out-of-State Prison Population on State Homicide Rates: Displacement and Free-Rider 
Effects, 36 CRIMINOLOGY 513, 513, 525, 529 (1998); Thomas B. Marvell & Carlisle E. Moody, 
The Impact of Prison Growth on Homicide, 1 HOMICIDE STUD. 205, 205, 220 (1997); see also 
Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors That Explain the Decline 
and Six That Do Not, 18 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 163, 184 (2004). 
222. See Raymond V. Liedka et al., The Crime-Control Effect of Incarceration: Does Scale Matter?, 5 
CRIMINOLOGY 245, 248–49 (2006). 
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quently, based on the available research, one could contend that a 10 percent in-
crease in incarceration is associated with (a) no decrease in crime rates, (b) a 22 
percent lower index crime rate, (c) a 2 percent to 4 percent decrease in crime rates, 
or (d) a decrease only in property crime but not violent crime.223  In short, to 
measure and weigh the possible crime reductive effects against the criminogenic 
and other consequences of incarceration has yet to be accomplished in any com-
prehensive and definitive manner.224 
Further, even if all of the relevant variables could be properly and definitive-
ly accounted for, the political and moral significance of crime reduction as com-
pared to other important social goals—such as equality, education, and poverty 
alleviation—would remain an open political and ethical question.225  To the ex-
tent crime prevention is entwined with larger goals of equality or education—for 
example preventing gender or race-based violence while simultaneously advancing 
gender or racial equality—crime prevention and reduction should not be pursued in 
a way that is inattentive to these other goals. 
In any event, at their best, regression analyses that seek to identify a rela-
tionship between crime rates and incarceration provide us with causal inferences 
about ways the world has behaved in the past.  Although an obvious point, it re-
mains an important, often overlooked consideration that these analyses rely on 
archival data and cannot meaningfully tell us how the world might be reconstitut-
ed in the face of significant shifts in social and political organization.  In other 
words, there is nothing in the existing statistical analyses of the crime-
incarceration relationship that undermines the interest or urgency of the ethical 
case for abolition and of other forms of social organization that might result in 
improved well-being and reduced violence. 
Additionally, any compelling account of the crime-reductive effects of in-
carceration ought to also be able to identify a mechanism through which incar-
ceration functions to deter crime, or rehabilitate or incapacitate criminals.226  Any 
such crime-reductive causal mechanism’s impact will be affected, of course, 
by those dimensions of incarceration that are undoubtedly criminogenic, in-
cluding the difficulty formerly incarcerated persons face in finding lawful 
  
223. See STEMEN, supra note 12, at 3. 
224. See John J. Donohue III, Assessing the Relative Benefits of Incarceration: Overall Changes and the 
Benefits on the Margin, in DO PRISONS MAKE US SAFER? THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE 
PRISON BOOM, supra note 12, at 272. 
225. See Harcourt, supra note 28, at 271 (writing of cost-benefit analyses focused on the efficiency of 
various crime-reductive measures that in “choosing a narrow objective and then simply costing 
alternative policies, we have shaped our political value system without ever having explicitly 
engaged politics”). 
226. For a discussion of the question of the retributive justification for punishment, see infra Part V.  
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employment after imprisonment and the vast incidence of unreported rape 
and other forms of violence inside prisons, to name but a few.227 
Those who support incarceration for its supposed deterrent effect generally 
ground their account on Gary Becker’s writings on the economics of crime.228  In 
brief, in Becker’s model, raising the costs of criminal activity by imposing a penalty 
of incarceration will cause a certain number of potential criminals to decide not to 
pursue criminal activity because they will rationally weigh the costs and benefits of 
their possible future criminal conduct.229  This model, however, rests on a set of 
assumptions that apply poorly to many people who are inclined to criminally of-
fend even if the model succeeds in capturing the deterrence of others who avoid 
criminal activity following cost-benefit calculations.  The model assumes (a) that 
those who break the criminal law rationally calculate the costs and benefits of 
their intended course of conduct; (b) that they possess information and beliefs 
that allow them to assume a high likelihood of apprehension and sentencing; and 
(c) that criminal punishment will render those subject to it no more likely to 
commit future crimes than they would be otherwise.  In fact, each of these as-
sumptions is subject to substantial doubt, especially when considering the class of 
people prison sentences purport to deter most immediately rather than those who 
are likely to be law-abiding because of reputational interests, secure employment, 
family obligations or otherwise.230  Many people who break the criminal laws do 
so in a condition of severe mental illness, alcohol or drug addiction, or in a state 
of rage.  In these cases, Becker’s assumptions of rational risk calculation are 
  
227. See, e.g., WESTERN, supra note 5, at 5 (reporting adverse criminogenic impacts of incarceration 
associated with difficulty in finding employment opportunities and disruption of family life); see 
also Amy E. Lerman, The People Prisons Make: Effects of Incarceration on Criminal Psychology, in DO 
PRISONS MAKE US SAFER?: THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE PRISON BOOM, supra note 
12, at 151, 152 (examining the “significant and criminogenic effect of placement in a higher-
security prison”). 
228. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968); 
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193 (1985); 
see also Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrence: A Review of the Evidence by a Criminologist for Econonomists, 5 
ANN. REV. ECON. 83, 83–105 (2013) (reviewing the literature on the deterrent effects of policing 
and incarceration and reporting generally some deterrent effects associated with policing, minimal 
deterrence associated with increased sentences of incarceration after a certain point, and little 
useful information on the deterrent effects of capital punishment). 
229. See Becker, supra note 228, at 176, 203. 
230. See, e.g., DEIRDRE GOLASH, THE CASE AGAINST PUNISHMENT: RETRIBUTION, CRIME 
PREVENTION, AND THE LAW 25 (2005) (“Most people have other reasons—such as reasons of 
conscience and effects on reputation—to refrain from committing serious crimes.  People who 
lack such reasons—who instead expect criminal behavior to enhance their reputations, or who are 
not deterred by pangs of conscience—may well be less responsive to punitive measures as well . . . . 
[Y]oung men who were not deterred from such killings by the immediate threat of deadly 
retaliation by the friends of the victim would hardly be deterred by the comparatively remote 
threat of imprisonment or even death at the hands of the criminal justice system.”). 
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questionable, and hence the deterrent qualities of incarceration will have uncer-
tain, if any, effect on them.231  Other people who break the criminal law surely 
believe (and often rightly so) that they are unlikely to be apprehended and sen-
tenced.  Most cases of child sexual abuse, for instance, go unreported, as do many 
cases of rape of adults; similarly, people in positions of power who engage in de-
ceptive economic transactions and even many who physically harm others rou-
tinely evade any adverse consequence.232  What is more, criminal punishment 
may make those who are imprisoned more, rather than less, likely to reoffend.  As 
discussed above, incarceration produces a set of destructive consequences for both 
the incarcerated and their communities, consequences that may tend to increase 
rather than decrease crime.233  This is not to say that incarceration has no deter-
rent impact,234 but that the assumptions of deterrence theory fail to apply to the 
large class of persons at whom criminal sanctions are directed, even if deterrence 
is effective in other cases.  And any deterrent potential of punitive policing and 
imprisonment should be assessed bearing in mind the dehumanizing, racially de-
grading, violent, and otherwise destructive dimensions of these practices.235 
  
231. See id. at 24–29 (debunking philosophically much of the deterrence rationale for the crime-
preventive effects of punishment); see also Neal Katyal, Deterrence’s Difficulty, 95 MICH. L. REV. 
2385 (1997) (discussing various factors that complicate and undermine the standard assumption 
that criminal punishment will create deterrence); Louis Michael Seidman, Soldiers, Martyrs, and 
Criminals: Utilitarian Theory and the Problem of Crime Control, 94 YALE L.J. 315 (1984) (exploring 
vulnerabilities of a utilitarian model of crime control).  There is also decidedly mixed evidence on 
the deterrent effects of order-maintenance policing.  See, e.g., Adam M. Samaha, Regulation for the 
Sake of Appearance, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1563, 1629 (2012) (analyzing extensively the empirical 
literature on “zero-tolerance” or “broken windows” policing and concluding that “[o]n the 
available evidence, a sensible conclusion is that the probability of generating a beneficial self-
fulfilling prophecy with broken windows policing is uncertain, low or confined in important 
ways”); see also John E. Eck & Edward R. Maguire, Have Changes in Policing Reduced Violent 
Crime?  An Assessment of the Evidence, in THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA 207, 228 (Alfred 
Blumstein & Joel Wallman eds., 2000) (“Overall, the evidence is mixed on the efficacy of generic 
zero-tolerance strategies in driving down rates of violent crime, though serious questions have 
been raised about their effects on police-community relations.”); BERNARD E. HARCOURT, 
ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING (2001) 
(analyzing the empirical evidence in support of broken windows policing and concluding the 
claims made in support of the theory on the basis of this evidence are false); Levitt, supra note 221, 
at 184 (explaining that zero tolerance policing practices probably do not explain much of the drop 
in crime in the 1990s because crime went down everywhere, even in places where police 
departments did not implement new policing strategies; rather, the decline in crime was caused by 
some combination of legalized abortion, the ebbing of the crack epidemic, increased 
imprisonment, and increases in the number of police). 
232. See, e.g., CORRIGAN, supra note 59 (examining the dramatic under reporting and under 
enforcement of violations of criminal laws relating to rape and sexual assault). 
233. See, e.g., WESTERN, supra note 5, at 5 (“The employment problems and disrupted family life of 
former inmates suggests that incarceration may be a self-defeating strategy for crime control.”). 
234. See Nagin, supra note 228. 
235. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 123–126. 
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Further questions apply to incarceration’s purportedly incapacitating effects.  
By removing people from their home communities and transferring them into 
prison, incarceration generally prevents prisoners from committing crimes out-
side prison.  But prison itself is a place where interpersonal violence, theft, and 
abuse are rampant and largely unreported.236  Therefore, incarceration does not 
necessarily reduce or incapacitate the commission of crime, but rather changes its 
location. 
In this respect, the argument for incapacitation reveals the disregard for the 
humanity of incarcerated persons that is inherent in the basic structure of U.S. 
penal discourse: This discourse only (or primarily) counts crime as significant if it 
occurs outside prison.  Yet approximately 216,000 sexual assaults occurred in 
U.S. prisons in 2008, making prisons perhaps the most sexually violent place in 
the country, a site of serial rape.237  A further complicating factor for any account 
of incarceration’s incapacitating effects is that, insofar as imprisonment is crimi-
nogenic, it may reduce crime outside prison during the time a person is incarcer-
ated, but it may likewise exacerbate that person’s likelihood of committing a 
criminal offense post-release.238 
Although there is some evidence that rehabilitative programming in prison 
reduces recidivism relative to incarceration in harsher, more punitive conditions, 
this does not demonstrate that imprisonment is more rehabilitative than other 
modes of social response outside of the prison setting.239  In fact, there is good 
reason to think that interventions that address addiction or provide educational 
opportunities would more likely enable different patterns of behavior upon re-
lease if they occurred in a context more closely parallel to one that persons would 
live within over the longer term rather than solely within the context of incarcera-
tion.240  This is not to deny the relative benefits of minimum security confine-
ment with opportunities for education and addiction recovery programming 
over, for instance, long-term solitary confinement (a reform not inconsistent with 
abolitionist aims), but instead to suggest that there is no persuasive evidence that 
rehabilitative incarceration is more likely to produce desired results than an alter-
native array of interventions not organized around imprisonment. 
Accordingly, although various studies have attempted to demonstrate the 
crime-reductive effects of carceral sentencing through analysis of large datasets of 
  
236. See supra text accompanying notes 123–126. 
237. See David Kaiser & Lovisa Stannow, Prison Rape and the Government, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Mar. 
24, 2011), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2011/mar/24/prison-rape-and-government. 
238. Cf. WESTERN, supra note 5, at 5. 
239. See, e.g., Lerman, supra note 227, at 152 (explaining that “there is a significant and criminogenic 
effect of placement in a higher-security prison”). 
240. See, e.g., WESTERN, supra note 5, at 5, 7. 
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reported crime and incarceration rates, as well as by using theoretical models of 
incarceration’s crime-reductive mechanisms, it remains the case, as economist 
John Donohue explains, that “the empirical literature has not yet generated 
clear and unequivocal answers to these key questions.”241  In particular, it is 
unclear whether “a reallocation of resources to alternative crime-fighting 
strategies would achieve the same benefits [of incarceration] at lower social 
costs . . . .”242  In economic terms, these analyses do not capture the potential op-
portunity costs of achieving order maintenance through prison-backed criminal 
law enforcement and incarceration, rather than through other means.243 
There is compelling evidence that the opportunity costs of allocating public 
resources to incarceration are immense.  Nobel Prize-winning economist James 
Heckman has found, for example, spending on early childhood education for dis-
advantaged children produces much higher returns than criminal law enforce-
ment expenditures.244  To properly assess the desirability of incarceration relative 
to alternatives such as Heckman’s, one must also consider the enormity of the 
economic resources allocated to imprisonment and punitive policing.  In 2008, 
U.S. federal, state, and local governments spent approximately $75 billion on cor-
rections, primarily on incarceration.245  Expenditures on incarceration are par-
ticularly concentrated on disadvantaged populations from narrowly confined 
geographic areas.  In certain blocks in Brooklyn, New York, for instance, the state 
has spent multiple millions of dollars per block per year to confine people in pris-
on.246  Similarly, Pennsylvania taxpayers have spent over $40 million per year to 
imprison residents from a single zip code in a Philadelphia neighborhood, where 
  
241. Donohue, supra note 224, at 272; see also John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, Allocating 
Resources Among Prisons and Social Programs in the Battle Against Crime, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 
(1998) (“[I]f a broadly implemented preschool program (more enriched than the current Head 
Start program) could generate half the crime-reduction benefits achieved in the pilot studies, then 
cutting spending on prisons and using the savings to fund intensive preschool education would 
reduce crime . . . .”); John J. Donohue & Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in 
the Death Penalty Debate, 58 STAN. L. REV. 791, 794, 841 (2005) (analyzing statistical studies of 
the deterrent effect of the death penalty and concluding there is not just “reasonable doubt” but 
“profound uncertainty” as to whether the death penalty has any deterrent effect). 
242. Donohue, supra note 224, at 272. 
243. See, e.g., John J. Donohue, Fighting Crime: An Economist’s View, 73 MILLIKEN INST. REV., Mar. 
2005, at 46. 
244. See, e.g., James J. Heckman & Dimitriy V. Masterov, The Productivity Argument for Investing in 
Young Children, 29 REV. OF AGRIC. ECON. 446, 447 (2007); James Heckman et al., 
Understanding the Mechanisms Through Which an Influential Early Childhood Program Boosted Adult 
Outcomes, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 2052 (2013). 
245. See JOHN SCHMITT ET AL., supra note 12. 
246. See Justice Mapping Center Launches First National Atlas of Criminal Justice Data, JUSTICE 
MAPPING CTR. (Oct. 5, 2010), http://www.justicemapping.org/archive/26/multi-
%E2%80%98million-dollar%E2%80%99-blocks-of-brownsville. 
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38 percent of households have annual incomes under $25,000.247  Likewise, in 
one neighborhood in New Haven, Connecticut, the state spent $6 million per 
year to return people to prison for technical parole and probation violations.248  
According to one recent study, reducing the incarcerated population convicted 
only of nonviolent offenses by half would result in cost savings of approximately 
$16.9 billion annually, without any significant associated decrease in public 
safety.249 
It also bears noting that much crime goes unreported, unmentioned, hidden 
by the shame associated with victimization or as a result of other fears, including 
the fear of sending loved ones to prison.250  These forms of violence are not mean-
ingfully accounted for in the existing analyses of incarceration’s efficacy.  Indeed, 
much of the violence police inflict on young African American men during police 
searches and seizures is not even understood as criminal.251 The same could be 
said of myriad forms of harm inflicted upon the relatively powerless and dispos-
sessed by those who escape entirely censure or redress.  A poem attributed to an 
anonymous poet of the 1700s, and circulated variously in prison writing since, 
captures this final point well: 
The law will punish a man or woman who steals the goose from 
the hillside, but lets the greater robber loose who steals the hillside 
from the goose.252 
In a speech to inmates in Cook County Jail in 1902, Clarence Darrow con-
veyed a similar abolitionist insight in these terms: 
The only way in the world to abolish crime and criminals is to abolish 
the big ones and the little ones together.  Make fair conditions of life.  
Give men a chance to live. . . .  There should be no jails.  They do not 
accomplish what they pretend to accomplish. . . . They are a blot upon 
any civilization, and a jail is an evidence of the lack of charity of the 
people on the outside who make jails and fill them with the victims of 
their greed.253 
  
247. See id. 
248. See Diane Orson, ‘Million Dollar Blocks’ Maps Incarceration’s Costs, NPR (Oct. 2, 2012), 
http://www.npr.org/2012/10/02/162149431/million-dollar-blocks-map-incarcerations-costs. 
249. See SCHMITT ET AL., supra note 12, at 1. 
250. See, e.g., CORRIGAN, supra note 59, at 78. 
251. But see Butler, supra note 13, at 155. 
252. Jalil Muntaqim, The Criminalization of Poverty in Capitalist America (Abridged), in THE NEW 
ABOLITIONISTS: (NEO)SLAVE NARRATIVES AND CONTEMPORARY PRISON WRITINGS, 
supra note 82, at 29, 29. 
253. Clarence Darrow, An Address to the Prisoners in the Cook County Jail, Chicago, Illinois—1902, in 
INSTEAD OF PRISONS, supra note 48, at 13. 
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* * * 
In sum, the evidence as to whether incarceration and prison-backed polic-
ing meaningfully make us more secure is mixed at best, at least when the broader 
harmful effects of incarceration are accounted for, along with crime that occurs in 
areas, forms, and among populations where it currently goes unreported, unno-
ticed, and unaddressed.  Unless the only important social goal is to reduce report-
ed crime outside of prison at all costs, questioning the efficacy of incarceration 
requires considering any crime-reductive effects of incarceration relative to ethical 
concerns, social consequences, welfare measures, aspirations, and opportunities 
incarceration forecloses to govern ourselves in other more humane and just ways.  
At a minimum, the available evidence on imprisonment’s efficacy does not di-
minish the importance of the critical abolitionist ethical demand. 
The next Part explores how a critical abolitionist ethic differs from a 
more moderate reformist framework, before turning to consider abolitionist 
aims in a positive register—in line with W.E.B. Du Bois’ account of abolition 
as a positive project—as well as with reference to an overlooked variant of 
grounded preventive justice. 
II. ABOLITION VERSUS REFORM 
Abolition promises to reorient both criminal law and politics in important 
and distinct respects.  There are five primary ways in which an abolitionist ethic is 
distinguishable from a more moderate reformist orientation.  First, an abolitionist 
ethic identifies more completely the dehumanization, violence, and racial degra-
dation of incarceration and punitive policing in the basic structure and dynamics 
of penal practices in the United States.  Rather than understanding these features 
as more superficial flaws that might be repaired while holding constant the role of 
criminal law administration relative to other social regulatory projects, a critical 
abolitionist ethic centers on how caging or confining human beings in a hierar-
chically structured, depersonalizing environment developed through historical 
practices of overt racial subordination tends inherently toward violence and deg-
radation.  In this, an abolitionist ethic more accurately identifies the wrong en-
tailed in holding people in cages or policing them with the threat of 
imprisonment, as well as more fully recognizes the transformative work that 
would be required to meaningfully alter these dynamics and practices. 
Second, an abolitionist ethic, in virtue of its structural critique of penal 
practices, is oriented toward displacing criminal law as a primary regulatory 
framework and replacing it with other social regulatory forms, rather than only 
or primarily moderating criminal punishment or limiting its scope or focus.  
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Displacing criminal regulation and replacing it with other regulatory forms en-
tails a primary orientation toward proliferating substitutive approaches to address 
social problems, root causes, and interpersonal harm through institutions, forms 
of empowerment, and regulatory approaches separate and apart from the criminal 
law.  By contrast, a more moderate reformist framework typically aims at reduc-
ing the costs and impositions of incarceration by granting people convicted of less 
serious offenses options for supervised, monitored release (typically backed by the 
threat of imprisonment for noncompliance with the more lenient terms).254  
Abolition’s critical project opens the space, in other words, for a positive project 
of proliferating social and regulatory alternatives to take the place of criminal law 
enforcement, and in this regard, abolition, as opposed to more moderate reform, 
enacts its profound skepticism of the legitimacy of prison-backed criminal regu-
latory interventions through its ongoing transformative efforts. 
Third, abolition in its radical call for change appropriately captures the in-
tensity that ought to be directed to transforming the regulation of myriad social 
problems through punitive policing and incarceration.  More modest reform, in 
tolerating with relative comfort imprisonment and punitive policing, does not 
register the need for change with as much urgency.  The following figure projects 
the time that would be required to return incarceration levels in the United States 
to where they were in 1980, assuming a rate of decline in incarceration equivalent 
to that which occurred in 2012.  The product of a perfect storm for prison re-
formists—fiscal crises in numerous states, relatively low rates of reported crime, 
and a growing political commitment in both more conservative and liberal states 
to reduce the harshness and cost of criminal sentencing approaches—2012 
marked a considerable decline in rates of imprisonment.255 
  
254. See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 14; KLEIMAN, supra note 14; Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 25; 
McLeod, supra note 127. 
255. See Charlie Savage, Trend to Lighten Harsh Sentences Catches on in Conservative States, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 12, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/13/us/13penal.html (noting increasing 
support in traditionally conservative states for reduced incarceration, including on the part of 
prominent conservatives such as Edwin R. Meese III, Grover Norquist, and Asa Hutchinson). 
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Historical and Projected U.S. Federal and State Prison Populations, Based on 2012 Rate 
of Decline 
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prisoners Series (Sentencing Project 2013). 
 
A reformist trajectory would likely under the best of circumstances yield de-
creases in incarceration roughly consistent with this course.  Whereas expanding 
diversionary noncarceral criminal supervisory mechanisms may be expected to ac-
celerate rates and avenues of decarceration, reform would in time, of course, face 
challenges during periods when, for one reason or another, public opinion tended 
in a more punitive direction than it did in 2012.  Even under these most optimal 
conditions, however, with consistent, marked incarceration-reductive reforms 
such as those in 2012, it would take almost one hundred years to return to 1980 
levels of imprisonment. Yet, already, in 2013, this downward trend reversed 
course as incarceration increased slightly at the state and federal levels.256 
Although a significant achievement, the commitment by the bi-partisan 
#Cut50 prison reform coalition to reduce incarceration levels by half in the Unit-
ed States over ten years, would still leave the United States an outlier in the ex-
panse and harshness of its criminal processes.257  This bi-partisan coalition 
primarily is able to achieve consensus on reducing incarceration primarily for 
nonviolent, nonserious, nonfelony convictions.258 And even if bi-partisan reform 
  
256. See Erick Eckholm, Report Finds Slight Growth in Population of Inmates, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/17/us/number-of-prisoners-in-us-grew-slightly-in-
2013-report-finds.html. 
257.  See, e.g., #Cut50, http://www.cut50.org. 
258.  See, e.g., Pat Nolan, Conservative and Liberals Join Together for Criminal Justice Reforms, 
HUFF. POST, Apr. 16, 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/pat-nolan/conservative-and-
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efforts were able actually to reduce the number of nonviolent offenders in prison 
and jail by half, the United States would still have by far the highest incarceration 
rate in the OECD.259 
But abolition makes a bolder critical demand, which requires more thor-
oughgoing transformation, recognizing the importance of a substitutive regula-
tory logic, rather than a shift from imprisonment to prison-backed noncarceral 
alternatives.  And even if abolition fails in its call for more marked change in 
criminal law enforcement, it renders moderate reform a more palatable op-
tion, potentially advancing a more moderate reformist program by articulat-
ing a critical and radically transformative project in the same legal and 
policy space. 
Fourth, an abolitionist ethic in its critical dimensions and moral resonance—
by exposing the dehumanization and illegitimate brutality of the core prison-
backed projects of the criminal process—stands to produce greater discomfort 
and shame in carrying out criminal punishment.  Even in those instances where 
imposing punishment remains perhaps necessary, as the lesser of two evils, when 
someone has committed and continues to pose a great threat of violence to oth-
ers, an abolitionist ethic does not allow us to remain complacent in the rationali-
zation of criminal law enforcement’s violence and neglect.  In this, an abolitionist 
ethic does not necessarily deny that in some instances there may be people so vio-
lent that they cannot be permitted to live among others.  (These individuals are 
referred to in abolitionist writings as “the dangerous few” in order to underscore 
how very rare they are relative to the vast population of the incarcerated (and how 
much rarer they might be if we chose to live in ways less productive of such vio-
lence)).260  But the associated discomfort and shame with which an abolitionist 
critique imbues such punishment promises to reshape the experience of punish-
ing even these dangerous few by rendering criminal politics and jurisprudence 
more conflicted and ambivalent, and thereby improved, both at the highest level 
of abstraction and in the most concrete doctrinal and statutory details.  This con-
flict, shame, discomfort, and ambivalence, in significant measure produced by an 
abolitionist critique of the ideology that rationalizes prison-backed punishment, 
simultaneously promises to make available broader imaginative horizons within 
which we are able to govern ourselves. 
  
liberals_b_7057184.html?utm_hp_ref=tw (celebrating Texas and South Carolina’s criminal law 
reforms to increase penalties for violent offenses and expand alternatives to incarceration for non-
violent offenses).  
259.  See JOHN SCHMITT ET AL., supra note 12, at 10–11. 
260. See Ben-Moshe, supra note 16, at 90 (examining abolitionist analyses of the problem of the 
dangerous few).  See also supra notes 49–64 and accompanying text. 
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Jonathan Simon, in Governing Through Crime: How the War on Crime 
Transformed American Democracy and Created a Culture of Fear, exposes how polit-
ical and social thought in the United States have come to focus on crime control 
to the exclusion of other frames of reference for governance.261  Simon explains 
that “[w]hen we govern through crime, we make crime and the forms of 
knowledge historically associated with it—criminal law, popular crime narrative, 
and criminology—available outside their limited original . . . domains as powerful 
tools with which to . . . frame all forms of social action as a problem for govern-
ance.”262  An important part of this ideological capture is, as Angela Davis reveals, 
the “simultaneous presence and absence” of incarceration and criminal law en-
forcement.263  Crime governance thrives when we are able to imagine we have 
addressed interpersonal violence, theft, and other problems by depositing certain 
people in prison.  But when we are forced to confront what prisons do, we are 
compelled to consider the ideological work prison performs.  We come to recog-
nize prison, then, as more than “an abstract site into which undesirables are de-
posited, relieving us of the responsibility of thinking about the real issues 
afflicting those communities from which prisoners are drawn in such dispropor-
tionate numbers.”264  An abolitionist ethic, by unmasking the hidden violence in-
herent in this ideological capture and by encouraging conflict about its 
perpetuation rather than unknowing acquiescence, promises to loosen the cap-
ture’s hold and renders us—citizens and legislators alike—better able to imagine 
other frameworks for governance and collective social life.  This is a product both 
of abolition’s fundamental moral condemnation of prison-backed criminal law 
enforcement’s legitimacy as a means of managing complex social problems, and 
of the awareness an abolitionist ethic facilitates about the choice—rather than the 
necessity—of addressing complex social problems through incarceration and pu-
nitive policing. 
At the level of judicial decision making and legislatively enacted criminal 
law, related forms of ideological capture confine the courts’ and legislatures’ ca-
pacities to address gross injustice in the criminal process.  Here too, then, an abo-
litionist ethic promises an escape, or at least a substantial challenge to, 
acquiescence in these legal commitments—especially to the primacy of finality of 
a criminal conviction, what I will call the “fetish of finality.”   
If we understand law in the powerful and evocative terms proposed by 
Robert Cover as part of a normative universe or “nomos,” we then appropriately 
  
261. See SIMON, supra note 5. 
262. Id. at 17. 
263. DAVIS, supra note 1, at 15. 
264. Id. at 16. 
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recognize that “law and narrative are inseparably related.”  Law, Cover explains, 
is “constituted by a system of tension between reality and vision,” between law as 
it is and our aspirations as to what it might become. 265  As Cover writes: “[L]aw 
is not merely a system of rules to be observed, but a world in which we live.”266  
He reveals how the normative and interpretive “commitments—of officials and 
of others— . . . determine what law means and what law shall be.”267  As judges 
carry out their interpretive work, they must attempt to resolve these competing 
normative claims; judges themselves are variously aligned and torn between war-
ring narratives and values as they steer law’s potential for violence or peace.268 
  An abolitionist ethic resists the circumscription of the nomos of criminal 
jurisprudence, inviting (even demanding) new perspectives within and against 
those which judges, legislators, and citizens might make law. More precisely, an 
abolitionist ethic contributes an unapologetic insistence on the brutal and morally 
illegitimate violence of criminal punishment—whether imprisonment or incar-
ceration followed by state-inflicted death—to the nomos of constitutional crimi-
nal jurisprudence.  This ethic throws down a gauntlet to the general 
jurisprudential comfort with the inevitability and moral unassailability of criminal 
conviction’s finality and lessens, perhaps, the dread of grinding the wheels of jus-
tice to a halt.269  In other words, an abolitionist ethic decenters the primacy of 
finality and the smooth operation of the criminal process such that it becomes 
less comfortable to rest at ease with the unimpeded operations of criminal 
punishment institutions, especially the imposition of imprisonment or a sen-
tence of death. 
In Herrera v. Collins,270 for example, the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
claims of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence do not state an in-
dependent ground for federal habeas relief absent identification of an independ-
ent constitutional violation, even in a case where a defendant is sentenced to die 
  
265. Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 5, 9 (1983). 
266. Id. at 5. 
267. Id. at 7. 
268. See id. at 53, 67. 
269. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993) (“[B]ecause of the very disruptive effect that 
entertaining claims of actual innocence would have on the need for finality in capital cases, and the 
enormous burden that having to retry cases based on often stale evidence would place on the 
States, the threshold showing for such an assumed right would necessarily be extraordinarily 
high.”); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 315 (1987) (“[I]f we accepted McCleskey’s claim that 
racial bias has impermissibly tainted the capital sentencing decision, we could soon be faced with 
similar claims as to other types of penalty.”). 
270. See 506 U.S. 390. 
Prison Abolition 1213 
and may be innocent.271  Although Justice Blackmun cautions in dissent that the 
“execution of a person who can show that he is innocent comes perilously close to 
simple murder,”272  Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, nonetheless con-
cludes that the important principle of finality trumps, given “the very disruptive 
effect that entertaining claims of actual innocence would have on the need for fi-
nality . . . .”273  This fetish of finality is grounded in a narrative and background 
norms—a nomos—that complacently treats the conventional criminal process 
followed by conviction and prison-based punishment (or killing by the state) as 
basically moral and just.  The majority opinion relates these ideas thus: 
In any system of criminal justice, “innocence” or “guilt” must be de-
termined in some sort of judicial proceeding. . . .  A person when first 
charged with a crime is entitled to a presumption of innocence, and 
may insist that his guilt be established beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Other constitutional provisions have the effect of ensuring against the 
risk of convicting an innocent . . . .  Once a defendant has been af-
forded a fair trial and convicted of the offense, the presumption of in-
nocence disappears . . . .  The existence merely of newly discovered 
evidence relevant to the guilt of a state prisoner is not a ground for re-
lief on federal habeas corpus.274 
This narrative telling naturalizes conviction as the point at which moral (or 
at least constitutional) concern ends, unless there has been a new and independ-
ent ground of constitutional error identified at trial.  This is true, on the Court’s 
account, even for a person who would be killed despite his possible innocence. 
An abolitionist ethic, by starkly calling into question the marker of convic-
tion as one that properly puts an end to moral (and constitutional) concern and 
instead exposes the dehumanization at the core of that legal marking practice, 
holds the potential to impose greater shame and discomfort, or at least ambiva-
lence and conflict, at this point of decision.  A prison abolitionist ethic holds this 
promise of unsettlement more powerfully than a death penalty abolitionist 
demand because prison abolition calls into question the legitimacy of the final-
ity of conviction as an end of moral concern in a more thoroughgoing and 
structural form. 
Death penalty abolition, by comparison, in proposing the substitution of life 
imprisonment without parole for state killing, reinforces the same account of the 
  
271. Id. at 400 (“Claims of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence have never been held 
to state a ground for federal habeas relief absent an independent constitutional violation occurring 
in the underlying state criminal proceeding.”). 
272. Id. at 446 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
273. Id. at 417 (majority opinion). 
274. Id. at 398–400 (citation omitted). 
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legitimacy of a conviction’s finality as does the Court’s majority, even if death 
penalty abolitionists prefer a non-death sentence.275  It is for this reason, perhaps, 
as Robin West pointedly and provocatively observes of the dissent in Herrera, 
that Justice Blackmun stops short of understanding the killing of a possibly inno-
cent person as homicidal and instead characterizes the Court’s chosen course as 
“perilously close to simple murder.”276  West writes: “That extraordinary remark, 
I believe, suggests two questions of relevance here: First, why ‘perilously close’? . . . 
[S]econd, is Blackmun suggesting that the Justices that did this are ‘perilously 
close’ to being murderers? . . . Or was he speaking metaphorically . . . . ?”277  Per-
haps instead, Justice Blackmun (who, famously, eventually himself became a 
death penalty abolitionist), similarly understands the imposition of conviction to 
lessen the moral concern for any act upon the convict that follows, even if that act 
entails killing a possibly innocent person, thereby transforming that conduct from 
simple murder into something instead “perilously close” to it.278 
The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) 
has codified this fetish of finality into a statutory framework that often causes 
constitutional challenges to criminal convictions in federal court to be altogether 
disregarded.  AEDPA purports to strip federal courts of jurisdiction to consider 
in habeas “a determination of a factual issue made by a State court,”279 and limits 
disturbing a state conviction in habeas to cases where “the facts underlying the 
claim [are] . . . sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for 
constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant 
guilty of the underlying offense.”280  As a consequence, under AEDPA, even in 
cases with gutting evidence of possible innocence, courts have deferred to the 
  
275. See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 1, at 106 (“As important as it may be to abolish the death penalty, we 
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279. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (2012) (“[A] determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall 
be presumed to be correct.”). 
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state’s right to kill possibly innocent persons on the ground that finality of a con-
viction must take priority over other moral and constitutional considerations. 
For example, in Cooper v. Brown, the Ninth Circuit ordered the denial of a 
Petition for Rehearing and Petition for Rehearing En Banc to which Judge Wil-
liam Fletcher wrote a more than one hundred page dissent.281  Judge William 
Fletcher began his dissent as follows: 
The State of California may be about to execute an innocent man.  
From the time of his initial arrest [in 1983] until today, Kevin 
Cooper has consistently maintained his innocence of the murders for 
which he was convicted . . . . There is substantial evidence that three 
white men, rather than Cooper [who is African American] were the 
killers. . . Some of the evidence, even though exculpatory, was delib-
erately destroyed [by the police] . . . . Some of the evidence, even 
though exculpatory, was concealed from Cooper . . . . [T]he only 
survivor of the attack, first communicated . . . that the murderers 
were three white men.282 
An earlier opinion in this case is also noteworthy for its discussion of the 
glaring evidence of law enforcement misconduct in the investigation of Kevin 
Cooper: 
Significant evidence bearing on Cooper’s culpability has been lost, de-
stroyed or left unpursued, including, for example, blood-covered cov-
eralls belonging to a potential suspect who was a convicted murderer, 
and a bloody t-shirt, discovered alongside the road near the crime 
scene.  The managing criminologist in charge of the evidence used to 
establish Cooper’s guilt at trial was, as it turns out, a heroin addict, and 
was fired for stealing drugs seized by the police.  Countless other al-
leged problems with the handling and disclosure of evidence and the 
integrity of forensic testing and investigation undermine confidence in 
the evidence.283 
Judge Fletcher concludes his impassioned dissent with this admonition: 
Doug, Peggy and Jessica Ryan, and Chris Hughes, were horribly 
killed.  Josh Ryen, the surviving victim, has been traumatized for 
life. . . .  The criminal justice system has made their nightmare even 
worse. . . .  Kevin Cooper has now been on death row for nearly half 
his life.  In my opinion, he is probably innocent of the crimes for which 
the State of California is about to execute him.  If he is innocent, the real 
  
281. Cooper v. Brown, 510 F.3d 870 (9th Cir. 2007), reh’g denied, 565 F.3d 581 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(Fletcher, J., dissenting). 
282. 565 F.3d 581, 581–85 (Fletcher, J., dissenting). 
283. 510 F.3d at 1004 (McKeown, J., concurring). 
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killers have escaped.  They may kill again.  They may already have done 
so.  We owe it to the victims of this horrible crime, to Kevin Cooper, 
and to ourselves to get this one right.  We should have taken this case 
en banc and ordered the district judge to give Cooper the fair hearing 
he has never had.284 
But Judge Rymer, by way of response, presumably representing the position 
of the majority of judges of the Ninth Circuit who voted to deny rehearing, pri-
marily relied on AEDPA’s codification of the fetish of finality, definitively con-
cluding of Judge Fletcher (and Kevin Cooper’s) claims, quite simply, that 
“AEDPA mandates their dismissal.”285 
Wider circulation of an abolitionist ethic, in calling the lie on the point of 
conviction as the end of moral (and constitutional) concern as codified by 
AEDPA, might facilitate an extension of Judge Fletcher’s outrage into further 
reaches of the judiciary and into legislatures and civil society, or at least an ever 
deeper moral unease at viewing conviction as making it less than simple murder 
to execute a quite possibly innocent man.  An abolitionist ethic promises, too, to 
increase all of our discomfort, shame, and conflict over ignoring the claim to hu-
manity of those who stand convicted, whether or not they are innocent or sen-
tenced to die.286 
Constitutional jurisprudence concerning racial bias in the criminal process 
similarly stands to be improved by the wider circulation of an abolitionist (as op-
posed to a reformist) ethic.  The Supreme Court’s opinion in McCleskey v. 
Kemp,287 for instance, dismissed the overwhelming evidence presented by Warren 
McCleskey of racial bias affecting Georgia’s capital-sentencing process.  The 
holding rested in large measure on a concern that “if we accepted McCles-
key’s claim . . . we could soon be faced with similar claims as to other types of 
penalty.”288  This narrative—effectively about the intolerable threat posed by 
grinding the wheels of justice to a halt—leads the Court to tolerate a death-
sentencing regime that impacts African Americans and white defendants differ-
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Anxiety About Innocence Projects, 13 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 315, 324, 329 (2010) (exploring 
the dangers posed by a focus on actual innocence in reducing concern about more pervasive forms 
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288. Id. at 315. 
Prison Abolition 1217 
ently on the basis of their race.289  So here, too, an abolitionist ethic, particularly 
in its attention to the racial violence that inheres at the core of the criminal pro-
cess, makes available a response to racially infected moral wrongs in criminal 
sentencing that is less defensive, less sure of the desirability of avoiding “similar 
claims as to other types of penalty,” and perhaps even willing to extend moral and 
constitutional concern to less obvious and deliberate sites of racial bias, as well as 
to persons who stand convicted of serious crimes.290  Along these lines, then, the 
shame, discomfort, ambivalence, and conflict with which an abolitionist ethic 
imbues criminal punishment may help us to begin to escape these confines, both 
in our politics more broadly and in the doctrines and legalist assumptions that 
make a fetish of criminal law’s finality. 
Fifth and finally, an abolitionist framework opens the space for a transfor-
mational politics involving different individual actors, groups, and communities 
to address the problems that haunt criminal law administration.  Rather than re-
ly on correctional experts—and their increasingly fine-tuned plans to reinvent 
probation or parole supervision to reduce crime or to render prisons more 
humane—an abolitionist ethic creates space within which community mem-
bers may organize themselves to empower vulnerable individuals and to ad-
dress crime prevention by other means.  One example of such an organization is 
the Brooklyn-based “Sistas Liberated Ground” (SLG).291  SLG is a group of 
women of color residents of Bushwick, Brooklyn, who have committed them-
selves to holding community members accountable for domestic violence and 
empowering vulnerable individuals to keep themselves safe, to locate safe spaces, 
to access mediation, and to address their needs for security without involving the 
criminal process unless they choose to do so.292  This sort of work is encouraged 
by an abolitionist ethic because abolition inspires forms of social organization to 
address interpersonal harm apart from criminal law enforcement, where other-
wise recourse to criminal law’s intervention would be more reflexive because it 
would be less subject to question and critique.  This positive project of abolition 
  
289. Cf. at 303, 315. 
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291. See Prison Moratorium Project, supra note 24. 
292. See id.  A further example of grassroots organizing along these lines, though not necessarily to 
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and prevention in an often overlooked register, which the remainder of this Arti-
cle explores, also promises to lessen the dread that accompanies the thought that 
judges and legislators (and others) might “soon be faced with similar claims as to 
other types of penalty”—that is, the terror of the idea that the wheels of the crim-
inal legal process might slow. 
The problem remains, of course, of how to envision in more complete terms 
a manner of preventing interpersonal harm consistent with this critical abolition-
ist ethic.  The remainder of this Article engages the preventive justice and related 
literatures toward this end, developing an overlooked and structurally focused 
form of grounded preventive justice not centered on individualized criminal law 
enforcement targeting. 
III. PREVENTIVE  JUSTICE 
Preventive justice designates a range of measures aimed at reducing the inci-
dence of harmful behavior, typically by targeting the risks posed by specific individ-
uals and less often by addressing the potential harm posed by given social situations.  
Preventive measures run the gamut from preventively detaining people deemed 
dangerous to increased spending on social programs that may serve to decrease 
crime.293  In some respects, in its most general sense the term preventive justice 
designates a field of regulatory activity not meaningfully distinguishable from 
general crime prevention apart from its reference to justice.   
The scholarly literature focused on preventive justice is overwhelmingly en-
gaged with critically considering the injustice of particular (recent) punitive pre-
ventive measures, like sex offense registries or terrorism watch lists, and with 
underscoring the threats to vulnerable populations and to the liberal, libertarian, 
and rule of law values imperiled by individualized preventive targeting in criminal 
law administration.294  This scholarly work is primarily and remedially focused on 
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addressing how procedural protections might limit the excesses of coercive, puni-
tive preventive measures.295   
By contrast, this Part explores a distinct and largely neglected structural and 
institutional conception of preventive justice that promises to minimize criminal 
law’s injustice and reduce crime.  This alternative conception is aimed at preven-
tion of interpersonal harm, along with other social problems, that might operate 
without enlisting criminal law enforcement.  Although the current organization 
of an idea of security around punitive policing and prison-backed punishment has 
gradually come to seem natural and inevitable, this alternative conception of pre-
ventive justice serves as a corrective to the false sense of necessity that so often ac-
companies punitive preventive policing and punishment.  Additionally, this 
alternative conception of preventive justice offers a manner of constraining puni-
tive preventive measures other than through procedural mechanisms—namely, 
by substantively conceptualizing prevention in other terms and proliferating 
noncoercive modes of facilitating collective security.   
This neglected framework of prevention may operate without involvement 
of the conventional criminal process, without targeting individual persons for 
heightened surveillance, and without jeopardizing core principles of justice and 
fairness.  Prevention so configured attends to the problems posed by interperson-
al violence and other criminalized conduct by decreasing opportunities to offend 
and confronting criminalized conduct without first resorting to policing, prose-
cution, and conventional criminal punishment.  This move away from preventive 
policing, prosecution, and punishment—away from the sort of interventions that 
Professor Bernard Harcourt has critically coined “punitive preventive measures”—
and toward situational, structural, and institutional prevention entails an alternative 
form of preventive crime regulation consistent with an abolitionist project in that it 
does not rely on strategies of intervention that instigate criminal law’s institutions, 
violence, or surveillance.296  Prevention in this alternative register may, for these 
reasons, function as a constructive supplement to a prison abolitionist ethic. 
This Part explores how this alternative conception of prevention is con-
sistent with an earlier vision of ensuring social order and collective peace, one 
that arguably dates to the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, but has 
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been largely abandoned or merely glossed over in contemporary criminal law 
scholarship.   
* * * 
Preventive justice first surfaced as a relevant concept in Anglo-American le-
gal discourse before there were established police forces, at a time when it re-
mained uncertain how rapidly industrializing societies would seek to limit 
interpersonal harm while maintaining a commitment to liberty and privacy.297  
Although Blackstone conceived of preventive justice as tied to directly policing 
probable criminals through an assessment of their character rather than other ac-
tuarial means,298 later social reformers were committed to a different approach to 
maintaining social order quite apart from what we would today conceive of as 
criminal law enforcement.299  The most famous of these reformers was Jeremy 
Bentham, who went as far in his unfinished Constitutional Code to explore the 
convening of a “Preventive Services Ministry,” the function of which would be to 
prevent “delinquency and calamity.”300  This conception of prevention was orga-
nized not so much around crime as around uncertainty, insecurity, and risk.301  Its 
purpose was to ensure the “security of [future] expectations” to the greatest extent 
possible.302  This involved an expanded conception of security, according to 
which individual criminal deviance was not any more of concern than the safety 
of mines and factories, precautions against fire and floods, and other “calamities” 
of nineteenth century life.303  Quite apart from his famous (or infamous) plans for 
panoptic prison reform, Bentham conceptualized security more broadly as a pro-
ject of environmental design and risk reduction.  As Martin Dubber has ex-
plained, “[Bentham’s] idea was to prevent the exigency.  And so the possibility of 
an exigency became the justification for police power actions, rather than the 
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Prison Abolition 1221 
exigency itself.”304  A professional punitive police power backed by the threat of 
imprisonment was thus not understood by Bentham and his contemporaries to 
be an inevitable force for preserving security, even as it is now an entirely taken for 
granted component of the modern state.  Indeed, there was widespread suspicion 
of and resistance to the establishment of a punitive preventive police force cen-
tered on crime interdiction, and this deep suspicion of punitive policing persisted 
for years.  As David Garland explores in his celebrated study, The Culture of Con-
trol: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society: 
[E]ven the idea of “police” referred not to the specialist agency that 
emerged in the nineteenth century but to a much more general pro-
gramme of detailed regulation. . . .  The aim of this kind of “police” 
regulation was to promote public tranquility, and security, to ensure 
efficient trade and communications in the city, and to enhance the 
wealth, health, and prosperity of the population.  To this end, city au-
thorities promulgated detailed by-laws calling for . . . programmes of 
street lighting [and] the regulation of roads and buildings . . . .305 
Even though the police force that began to take shape during the nineteenth 
century focused more directly on crime control, the original purpose of preven-
tion was “not to pursue and punish individuals but to focus upon the prevention 
of criminal opportunities and the policing of vulnerable situations.”306 
During this time period, the idea that punitive policing would take up the 
work of limiting interpersonal harm was dismissed for decades as illiberal, prone 
to tyrannical abuse, and dangerous.  For example, a Select Committee in the 
British House of Commons convened for three years to consider the introduction 
of a formal police force, concluding in 1818: 
[T]hough their property may occasionally be invaded, or their lives 
endangered by the hands of wicked and desperate individuals, yet the 
institutions of the country being sound, its laws well administered, and 
justice executed against offenders, no greater safeguards can be ob-
tained, without sacrificing all those rights which society was instituted 
to preserve.307 
The Committee thus recognized that risk of harm was an inevitable threat associ-
ated with social life.  Consequently, the Committee could not conceive that 
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extraordinary measures could be taken to avert crime and the risk thereof be-
yond institutional and structural efforts to limit risk and isolated responses 
against those individuals who committed offensive wrongs.  Instead, by and 
large, these reformers thought that society ought to organize itself to minimize 
crime without unnecessary individual targeting, both by empowering people to 
care for themselves and by organizing collective social life to minimize opportuni-
ties for victimization and harm.  This premise is at the core of the potential con-
fluence of an abolitionist framework and this earlier form of prevention focused 
on structural measures of risk reduction rather than individualized targeting. 
Along these lines, the Select Committee of the House of Commons 
acknowledged: 
It is no doubt true, that to prevent crime is better than to punish it: but 
the difficulty is not in the end but the means, and though your com-
mittee could imagine a system of police that might arrive at the object 
sought for, yet in a free country, or even in one where any unrestrained 
intercourse of society is admitted, such a system would of necessity be 
odious and repulsive, and one which no government would be able to 
carry into execution. . . . [T]he very proposal would be rejected with 
abhorrence; it would be a plan which would make every servant of eve-
ry house a spy upon the actions of his master, and all classes spies upon 
each other.308 
Again in 1822, the House of Commons Select Committee Fourth Report 
concluded: 
It is difficult to reconcile an effective system of police, with that perfect 
freedom of action and exemption from interference, which are the 
great privileges and blessings of society in this country; and your 
Committee think that the forefeiture or curtailment of such ad-
vantages would be too great a sacrifice for improvements in police, or 
facilities in detection of crime, however desirable in themselves if ab-
stractly considered.309 
Only in 1828 did a Select Committee finally recommend the convening of a 
centralized criminal police force, but the force’s purpose was to prevent crime 
through diversified regulation, not to serve as an adjunct to punishment.  As the 
Committee explained, “[the force’s] main object ought to be the prevention of 
crime, and not the punishment of it.”310  When a Scottish magistrate, Patrick 
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Colquhoun, sought to centralize the police by creating an organization with 
fulltime police officers, officers were to address indigence, not just crime.311  To 
the extent officers sought to prevent crime directly, policing was to be organized 
to prevent criminal opportunities and vulnerable situations.312  Colquhoun’s 
Treatise on the Police of the Metropolis conceptualizes preventive policing to include 
regulations involving “markets, hackney-coach stands, paving, cleansing, light-
ing, watching, marking streets, and numbering houses.”313  It was apparent to 
these social reformers that any program of policing or crime regulation should 
consider education, employment, social integration, and engagement as indis-
pensable and central components of their mandate.  Even to proponents of polic-
ing, the advent of an organized police was understood to be part of a diversified 
form of governance, primarily social rather than punitive in orientation, and one 
in which citizens and society were principally responsible for crime prevention.314 
In the intervening centuries, an idea of security organized around punitive 
policing and prison-backed punishment gradually has come to seem natural and 
inevitable, but this earlier conception of prevention may offer a corrective to that 
false sense of necessity and to the scholarship and reformist efforts centered on 
containing punitive preventive measures solely through procedural reform (rather 
than substantively reconceptualizing prevention in other terms and proliferating 
noncoercive modes of prevention).315  Much of the work of prevention in this al-
ternative register is situation-specific, incremental, and unglamorous, but it 
promises the most urgently needed change in practices of overcriminalization and 
to criminal law enforcement’s violence.  
A further factor commending prevention in this alternative register, and an 
abolitionist ethic more broadly, is that the violence and dehumanization that 
haunts criminal law administration, and the needed reduction in overcriminaliza-
tion and overpunishment, requires a much more radical shift than merely an at-
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tack on coercive preventive measures like sex offense registries or terrorism 
watchlists and a concomitant expansion of procedural protections.  Different ap-
proaches are needed within which prevention may be conceptualized apart from 
individualized targeting and coercion, both before and after the fact of a criminal 
conviction.  Preventive ambitions, as Fred Schauer has illuminated, are of course 
ubiquitous throughout the criminal law: “[U]sing the criminal law in order to 
achieve preventive goals is a pervasive dimension of our long-standing practices 
of punishment . . . .”316  Although critics of punitive preventive measures decry 
the procedural informality—or even irregularity—that routinely accompanies 
such measures (and importantly and rightly so), these critics overlook how evis-
cerated procedural protections are characteristic not just of the preventive periph-
ery of precrime enforcement, but of most of the adjudications at criminal law’s 
core.317  As political theorist Stephen G. Engelmann provocatively put it, “[I]n 
the criminal law . . . elaborate procedures . . . are routinely suspended in ongoing 
orgies of plea-bargaining.”318  These “orgies of plea-bargaining” are produced 
by the often almost exclusive reliance on criminal law administration to 
manage social risk rather than proliferating other noncriminal forms of pre-
vention and justice. 
More far-reaching emphasis on this framework of prevention would benefi-
cially focus conventional criminal law’s properly reactive processes on those rela-
tively rare instances where some form of collective sanction—subject to 
procedural protections—is most called for.  Such circumstances might include 
those relatively limited situations of interpersonal harm—instances of rape and 
murder, chief among them—where the rituals of the criminal process may per-
form important and desirable societal work, or at least for which we can conceive 
presently of no other appropriate response. 
The following Part continues to reconceptualize criminal law’s necessary 
ambit and the prevention of harm outside the institutions that form the penal 
arm of the state. 
IV. RECONCEPTUALIZING PREVENTION 
This Part surveys an array of preventive projects that operate in this alterna-
tive social institutional and structural register.  In so doing, the analysis that fol-
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lows begins to illustrate what an abolitionist framework would entail for crime 
prevention, justice, and security. 
A. Justice Reinvestment 
Justice reinvestment has become a catchphrase in criminal law reformist dis-
course to describe various efforts to reduce spending on imprisonment, some of 
which include substituting shock incarceration-backed probation monitoring for 
longer prison sentences.319  But justice reinvestment in line with an abolitionist 
framework means something different, more specific, and more thoroughgoing: 
It involves reconceptualizing justice and prevention in ways that independently 
strengthen valuable social projects that would simultaneously stand to reduce 
crime.  This entails reinvesting criminal law administrative resources in other sec-
tors and also reinvesting the concepts of justice and prevention with more expan-
sive meaning. 
In the broadest terms, justice reinvestment along these lines would refocus 
collective energy on strengthening the social (rather than the criminal) arm of the 
state out of concern for justice and in virtue of a commitment to security, and, as 
this Article has argued, as a project of criminal law reform consistent with an abo-
litionist ethic.  Preventive justice in its overlooked structural variant provides a 
conceptual ground for understanding security anew in terms much deeper and 
more vast than mere crime prevention through probationary supervision.320  Se-
curity is more meaningfully furthered in these terms by social solidarity, flourish-
ing neighborhoods, dignified work, education, labor unions, empowerment of 
vulnerable persons, community organizations, and basic social infrastructure.321 
In more specific terms, recall the economist Heckman’s research on the so-
cial importance of early childhood education relative to other criminal law ad-
ministrative interventions to address crime.322  The early childhood educational 
organizations that are the subject of Heckman’s ongoing work include an array 
of well-established and pilot programs centered on education, health care, and 
expanding social opportunities for very young disadvantaged children.323  These 
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institutions serve as models of preventive justice and justice reinvestment in these 
terms—promoting social flourishing and security, as well as preventing harm and 
allocating resources to more just ends, in accord with a broader, more meaningful 
conception of justice than reactive criminal punishment serves.324  This is not to 
claim that these social projects are exclusively positioned to take up the work of 
justice reinvestment within an abolitionist framework, but to identify the shapes 
that reinvestment and just prevention consistent with an abolitionist ethic could 
take in terms resonant with W.E.B. Du Bois’ vision of positive abolition. 
B. Decriminalization 
De jure and de facto decriminalization are similarly an important compo-
nent of prevention and justice in a structural register and consonant with an abo-
litionist ethic—both preventing crime and acting in service of a fuller conception 
of justice than punishment of minor offenses achieves.  Decriminalization may 
assume any number of forms.  Numerous U.S. jurisdictions have decriminalized 
marijuana, which stands to reduce the harms of punitive policing of marijuana 
users and to prevent all marijuana offenses currently criminalized.325  Although 
marijuana convictions constitute only a very small part of the problems associated 
with U.S. criminal law administration, punitive policing of marijuana users ena-
bles the racial harassment of thousands of young men of color, including many of 
the 50,000 persons arrested in 2011 in New York City for minor possession of 
marijuana.326  Some jurisdictions have gone considerably further, such as Portu-
gal, which in 2001 became the first European country to abolish criminal sanc-
tions for personal possession of narcotics, including heroin, cocaine, and 
methamphetamine.327  Although persons involved in possession of these narcot-
ics may be referred through a civil order for treatment, there is no threat of im-
prisonment that accompanies noncompliance with such a referral.  Notably, in 
the aftermath of complete decriminalization of drug possession in Portugal, the 
number of HIV infections transmitted by sharing needles decreased and the 
percentage of adolescents using narcotics declined, while the numbers of people 
pursuing addiction treatment increased substantially.328 
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De facto decriminalization, or at least reduced sentencing, may involve ex-
ercises of police or prosecutorial discretion to simply not pursue, arrest, or prose-
cute particular categories of cases while retaining a legal norm of criminalization.  
For example, in 2013 Attorney General Eric Holder instructed assistant U.S. at-
torneys not to charge particular criminal cases in a way so as to trigger certain stiff 
criminal sentences.329   
Importantly and additionally, efforts to confront the “school-to-prison 
pipeline” by eliminating zero-tolerance policies in schools that turn children who 
misbehave in school over to police are another significant measure to eliminate 
criminalization. Reform along these lines stands to address some of criminal law’s 
violence in a readily achievable manner consistent with an abolitionist ethic.330   
Although the precise scope of desirable de jure and de facto decriminaliza-
tion remains uncertain, and though there is surely some violent conduct that the 
law ought to plainly condemn, decriminalization deserves a more prominent 
place than it currently occupies in criminal law reformist discourse, both in the 
narcotics context and elsewhere.331 
C. Creating Safe Harbors 
Another crucial component of an abolitionist approach to prevention is a 
form of social organization that enables vulnerable persons and communities to 
care for themselves, rather than having to rely exclusively on the criminal law ad-
ministrative apparatus to serve basic needs for personal and community security.  
The Brooklyn-based “Sistas Liberated Ground” (SLG) is again illustrative—an 
instance of both facilitating forms of restorative justice and mediation as well as 
creating a safe harbor for those vulnerable to domestic violence.332  Similarly, Vio-
lence Interrupters, a program pioneered by epidemiologist Gary Slutkin, consists 
of a task force of community mediators, many of whom are formerly gang-
involved community members, who may be called upon to help deescalate situa-
tions of mounting community conflict, whether gang-related or otherwise.333  
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Studies of Violence Interrupters’ work in Chicago and Baltimore, conducted by 
researchers at Northwestern and Johns Hopkins Universities, found that homi-
cide rates decreased with the implementation of these programs.334  In one 
neighborhood, the rates decreased by over 50 percent.335  These are interventions 
that borrow from restorative models of dispute resolution but ground those prac-
tices in specific community-based projects. 
This model of community self-care occupied a central place in the Black 
Panther Party’s philosophy as a means of enabling people to avoid reliance on 
criminal law enforcement to solve legal and social problems.  The Black Panthers, 
for instance, convened “People’s Free Medical Clinics” in cities around the coun-
try in the 1970s, after the Civil Rights Acts were passed.336  Though the Black 
Panther Party is not often remembered in these terms today, their public health 
initiatives sought to foster liberatory politics organized around creating safe spac-
es and community well-being.  Freedom and justice, in these terms, following 
W.E.B. Du Bois, are understood in terms of an end of racial subordination as a 
positive project of human flourishing, rather than merely freedom from discrimi-
nation or as a punitive response in the wake of wrongdoing.  
Prevention in a structural register might also be understood, then, more 
generally to encompass the creation of additional spaces of liberatory security sep-
arate from the criminal arm of the state—spaces in which harm is prevented and 
just conditions are manifest at a small scale, as well as alternative forms of dispute 
resolution, restorative interventions of the sort implemented by SLG and similar 
organizations. 
D. Alternative Livelihoods 
Alternative livelihoods programs also rely upon institutions separate from 
criminal law enforcement to prevent conduct otherwise frequently addressed 
through criminal law administration.  Alternative Development Programming, 
for example, undertaken by the United Nations in the criminal law and develop-
ment context, subsidizes narcocultivators to shift to nonnarcotic crops, and then 
assists growers in accessing national and international markets until they are able 
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to make the financial transition to the alternative crop by themselves.337  In cer-
tain programs, participation is voluntary and unaccompanied by the threat of 
criminal or other penalties.  Over time, many narcocultivators switch to the legal 
alternative if it becomes equivalently lucrative.  Transition to alternative crops is 
associated with a significant reduction in threats of violence due to the insecurity 
that accompanies narcotics trafficking.338  Relatedly, certain Latin American 
countries have sought to purchase cocoa crops from growers, which may be used 
in manufacturing products like toothpaste and soap.339  More generally, these al-
ternative development programs offer a manner of conceptualizing how crime 
prevention might be attempted through employment programs and small busi-
ness development assistance, such as for those involved in narcotics sales in the 
United States, as well as for those involved in other forms of for-profit criminal 
activity.340  These initiatives thus prevent harm and enable more sustainable con-
ditions of social life. 
E. Universal Design 
Improved security may also be enabled by simple design innovations that 
leave public spaces better lit to reduce the likelihood of assault in public at night, 
as well as by making products less susceptible to theft.341  The regulation of theft 
and shoplifting provides one illustration of how design innovations may actually 
more effectively and cheaply prevent the offending conduct, simultaneously pro-
moting the ends of justice by avoiding unnecessary criminal law enforcement.  
Shoplifting may be regulated either through policing, prosecution, and punish-
ment, or through using infrastructural and design-focused preventive interven-
tions.  On a criminal regulatory model that targets individual thieves, in-store 
security and registers of suspected offenders identify shoplifters (these are exam-
ples of individualized precrime preventive targeting).  In instances of identified 
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violations, accused individuals may be subject to arrest, charge, prosecution, and 
punishment (with both post-offense responsive ambitions and preventive deter-
rent ambitions).  But shoplifting may also be preventively addressed, and arguably 
more effectively so, by using design interventions, which do not entail the indi-
vidual liberty intrusions associated with either punitive preventive or conventional 
criminal law enforcement responses.  Local business groups or city regulations 
could instead require store owners to implement store policies, such as packaging 
and display practices, that make it virtually impossible to steal.342  Thus, shoplift-
ing need not be a prosecutorial priority in order to reduce its incidence very con-
siderably; by contrast, the available evidence suggests that police arrest less than 
one percent of shoplifters, so the design-based, noncriminal regulatory regime 
may actually be more effective.343  Auto theft likewise may be prevented through 
straightforward changes by auto manufacturers to vehicles so as to make it either 
impossible to access the car to steal it or to inhibit the mobility of a car in the case 
of intrusion.344  This simple form of prevention promises not only less individual-
ized targeting by police through reduced criminal law enforcement involvement, 
but also potentially, at least in the case of theft, improved effectiveness. 
F. Urban Redevelopment 
Urban redevelopment is a further way to promote security, even from 
violent crime.  Redevelopment can engage community members in com-
mon projects and populate urban areas that might otherwise be desolate, 
particularly those plagued by violence.  More generally, these projects also 
promise to enhance community well-being.  For example, one recent study of ur-
ban “greening” projects, conducted by epidemiologists at the University of Penn-
sylvania School of Medicine, found that “greening was associated with reductions 
in certain gun crimes and improvements in residents’ perceptions of safety.”345  
The study randomly selected two groups of vacant lots in Philadelphia: One set 
was greened through an urban gardening initiative and the other, which was not, 
served as the control.  Assault in the general area, both with and without guns, 
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declined after the greening began and residents’ general sense of safety and secu-
rity near their homes improved.346  The study’s authors attribute these associa-
tions to a greater sense of unity fostered in the neighborhood as a result of the 
common project, as well as the greater difficulty in hiding guns and criminal ac-
tivity in a green space as opposed to a trash-filled lot.347 
This research builds upon University of Pennsylvania epidemiologist Charles 
Branas’s work comparing outcomes associated with thousands of greened and non-
greened vacant lots over the course of nine years.348  Branas found that greening 
could be associated with reduced gun assaults, vandalism, stress, and increased 
physical exercise.349 
In 2010, there were 40,000 vacant lots in Philadelphia, many in neighbor-
hoods suffering from considerable violence and neglect.350  Detroit—another city 
with high rates of criminalization, arrest, incarceration, and gun violence—has 
approximately forty square miles of vacant lots and is considering whether to con-
vert some of these lots to greened uses.351  Cleveland, partly in response to this 
body of research, has created a program to supply grants to community 
groups to manage parcels of vacant land.352  Proposals have included com-
munity gardens and orchards, as well as permeable parking structures.353 
Greening surely cannot eliminate all violence in urban spaces, but it is an in-
stance of a preventive measure consistent with an abolitionist ethic that may, at a 
minimum, improve residents’ impressions of safety and thereby improve com-
munity well-being.354  Regardless of whether the “broken windows” theory of po-
licing is empirically valid, greening and other urban redevelopment projects are 
ways to promote “orderliness” that do not involve punitive policing interventions 
with all their known costs and exemplify an approach that promises other 
demonstrated benefits, including the empowerment of impacted communities to 
seek security and justice in other terms than through criminalization and incar-
ceration.355 
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The following Part considers further whether and how justice may be 
achieved within an abolitionist framework focused generally on structural preven-
tion rather than punishment of crime. 
V. GROUNDING JUSTICE 
Thus far, this Article has argued that a broader framework of grounded 
justice—concerned with human welfare as well as legacies of racial subordina-
tion and practices of dehumanization—demands a rejection of much of the 
work currently performed by the criminal legal process in the United States, as 
well as compelling a central place for an overlooked variant of structural preven-
tion, and a departure from continued reliance on primarily retributive, individual, 
punitive, criminal legal responses to interpersonal violence and other forms of so-
cially harmful conduct.  To the extent that more just outcomes may be achieved 
by prioritizing structural forms of prevention over individual criminal response, 
this broader conception of grounded justice requires allocation of energy and re-
sources to social structural responses over criminal prosecution and punishment.  
Doing so does not require immediately eliminating the ability to invoke the ritu-
als of the criminal process in certain instances of grave interpersonal harm.  Yet, 
the determination in cases of significant individual wrongdoing of whether to rely 
on criminal punishment and how much should always be a difficult one. There is 
no easy manner of determining how or when this should be done, though any 
such imperfect determination ought to seek to condemn violence, promote secu-
rity, and protect the human dignity, freedom, and equality of the accused and ac-
cuser alike.  An abolitionist ethic entails, in any case, that we should strive to 
eliminate the need to invoke such punitive responses and approach their invoca-
tion with deep conflict and ambivalence, even shame. 
This account of grounded justice, of course, is in deep tension with a retrib-
utivist account of criminal punishment.  A retributivist objection to this account 
of abolition and prevention—of grounded justice—might run as follows: Retrib-
utive justice requires that any wrongful and illegal act be followed by state-
imposed punishment, subject to fair procedural constraints, in order to counteract 
the harm done by the offender to the victim, honor the moral agency of both the 
victim and the perpetrator, and to recognize the threat posed to the democratical-
ly endorsed rule of law.356  Any punishment should proportionally match the 
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wrong of the crime, considering both the offender’s culpability and the harm 
suffered by the victim.357  Only fitting criminal punishment, in this view, respects 
the free moral agency of the defendant and the victim alike.358  Imprisonment is 
the primary institution for imposing just punishment because it avoids overt bru-
tality that eliminates human agency or makes a spectacle of violence, such as the 
imposition of a death penalty or flogging, and because of a democratic consensus 
around incarceration as a criminal sanction.359  The retributivist objection might 
posit, therefore, that an abolitionist ethic and its instantiation of prevention in a 
noncoercive register is contrary to these principles because it ignores the de-
mands of justice (and of retributive justice in particular) by addressing wrongdo-
ing through interventions focused institutionally, structurally, and socially, 
rather than by fitting punishment to legally and morally condemn criminalized 
acts and recognize the moral agency of the criminal perpetrator and the victim 
alike. Although a retributivist would likely be receptive to the critique of the U.S. 
criminal process for its disproportionality and other excesses, so too is the aboli-
tionist turn to grounded preventive justice in tension with retributivism’s com-
mitment to proportional agency-respecting punishment. 
An abolitionist response to this retributivist account centers not only on the 
above sketch of justice in a broader social frame, but also on what I am calling 
grounded justice—an account of justice that is concerned with how ethical analy-
sis fares in light of the operations of criminal and other processes in the world.  
On this account, what counts as a just response to criminalized conduct turns cru-
cially on the sociological, historical, and institutional settings in which punish-
ment actually unfolds and has historically unfolded.  Justice should be centrally 
concerned with those empirical facts and the possibilities that actually inhere 
within ongoing situations of punishment.  Especially relevant are the known facts 
about the furthest horizons of possibility for transforming those settings, their 
fundamental structures and dynamics, and the most concerning forms of inter-
personal harm that transpire within them.  The brutal violence, dehumanization 
and racially subordinating organization of the institutions in the United States 
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that administer criminal law are not merely incidental facts but ought to mean-
ingfully inform the terms that any aspirational account of justice should adopt. 
Grounded justice and an abolitionist ethic participate in what political theo-
rist Raymond Geuss has argued political philosophy ought to engage: A theoreti-
cal project of ethical reflection that is deeply concerned with sociological, 
historical, and political situations and possibilities rather than primarily with de-
ductive moral reasoning from first premises.360  In this respect, Geuss writes criti-
cally of political philosophy in what he describes as a dominant “Rawlsian” vein, 
which is concerned generally with identifying abstract conditions of justice sepa-
rate from a critique and analysis of existing social and political circumstances.  
Geuss suggests tendentiously that: 
“[N]ormative” moral and political theory of the Rawlsian type [fo-
cused in large part on inequality] has nothing, literally nothing, to 
say about the real increase in inequality [that coincided with the as-
cendance of this mode of political philosophy in the academy], ex-
cept perhaps “so much the worse for the facts…”  This is not a 
criticism to the effect that theoreticians should act rather than merely 
thinking, but a criticism to the effect that they are not thinking about 
relevant issues in a serious way.361 
Reading Geuss charitably, his point is not to hold political philosophy re-
sponsible for any broader structural changes in the world that occurred during a 
period of one political theoretical school’s ascendance; rather, he presents a pro-
vocative critique of the choice on the part of certain political theorists of inequali-
ty to elect a mode of analysis largely disengaged from the sociological and political 
economic conditions within which inequality persists in the world.  
Geuss continues with a positive account of what this mode of theoretical 
analysis would entail (and the account of grounded justice elaborated here extends 
this to the realm of criminal law and philosophy and legal theory).  Geuss pro-
poses a form of political philosophical reflection that grapples with theoreti-
cal questions and with history, social, and economic institutions, and the real 
world of politics in a reflective way.  This is not incompatible with  
“doing philosophy;” rather, in this area, it is the only sensible way to pro-
ceed.  After all, a major danger in using highly abstractive methods in 
political philosophy is that one will succeed merely in generalizing one’s 
own local prejudices and repackaging them as demands of reason.362 
  
360. See RAYMOND GEUSS, OUTSIDE ETHICS 38 (2005). 
361. Id. 
362. Id. at 38–39. 
Prison Abolition 1235 
Although its full elaboration is beyond the scope of this Article and will be 
reserved for future work, the account of grounded justice here begins to apply to 
criminal law theory this more general account of empirically engaged political 
theoretical work proposed by Geuss, and seeks to theorize alternatives to pun-
ishment through prison abolition and grounded prevention with attention to the 
social contexts in which criminal law in the United States operates in virtue of its 
historical inheritance and basic structures. This is not merely a distinction be-
tween ideal and nonideal theory, but an account of how and to what extent theo-
retical analysis and critique ought to take stock of, engage with, and respond to 
ongoing conditions in the world.  An abolitionist framework sets as an aspira-
tional goal the elimination of prison-based punishment and prison-backed polic-
ing in the United States because of an engaged analysis of present and past U.S. 
practices of punishment.  Ultimately, the dehumanizing nature and racially sub-
ordinating legacy of criminal punishment in American society compel the con-
clusion that, all things considered, an abolitionist orientation is preferable to a 
retributivist one, arguably even to advance certain retributivist ends concerned 
with respecting the moral agency of persons. 
So a further response to the retributivist objection in reference to grounded 
justice would continue like this: Despite the intuitive appeal of certain premises of 
retributivism, the retributivist account does not offer a vision of criminal punish-
ment that is anywhere close to just in a society that even partially resembles our 
own.363  Even if we grant that the relevant ideal justification of punishment is re-
tributive, we should consider what actual retribution will be, rather than some 
idealized, seemingly unachievable version of it.  If we insist that retribution is re-
quired in a particular instance and should take a particular form, we should advo-
cate as vigorously for retribution taking that form in reality (rather than the brutal 
form it currently takes) as we do for retribution in principle.  This is what the 
principles of retribution themselves demand—the abolition of much of our cur-
rent regime of agency-disrespecting criminal law and punishment. If agency-
respective prison-based punishment is infeasible for the reasons this Article 
explores, then even on retributivist grounds, an abolitionist ethic registers a 
compelling claim. 
Further concerns about even the retributivist ideal, apart from its unattaina-
bility in a society constituted as ours is, arise when attending to the question of 
what justice requires in its full, grounded complexity. Consider, for example, the 
  
363. See DAVID BOONIN, THE PROBLEM OF PUNISHMENT 94–103 (2008) (arguing that legal 
punishment is unjustified because no philosophical justifications of legal punishment, including 
retributivist justifications, are valid). 
1236 62 UCLA L. REV. 1156 (2015) 
case of rape.  It is unclear why justice requires primarily that for a rape one should 
spend a period of years in prison. Why does imprisonment justly “fit” the crime of 
rape or respect the agency of the rapist and the dignity and harm suffered by the 
survivor of rape?   These facts ought to have some bearing on the answer to these 
questions: That many rapes are unreported in part because of how poorly crimi-
nal law responds to the harms of rape, that survivors whose rapes are prosecuted 
are on some accounts significantly less well off than those who do not seek redress 
through the criminal process, that rape is especially pervasive in prison, and that 
there are other means of preventing and perhaps even redressing rape that more 
effectively address the risk and harm of sexual violence.364  At a minimum, on an 
account of grounded justice, responding to the problem of rape requires a much 
broader framework for conceptualizing a just response than retributive punish-
ment focused on carceral responses affords.  This is not to say criminal law ought 
to play no part in responding to sexual violence, but that the alternative registers 
of prevention and justice explored here ought to take primacy of place in address-
ing the conditions that render so many persons, including prisoners themselves, 
vulnerable to sexual violation, and in responding to those violations.365 
Additional questions responsive to the retributive objection that sound in 
terms of grounded justice are as follows: By what figures or metric should specific 
sentences be anchored in order to be proportionate and agency-respecting given 
the actual contexts of punishment or the possible contexts of punishment in the 
United States?  How should we measure harm and culpability so as to meaning-
fully match carceral punishment in the United States to crime given what we now 
know about the inherent dynamics, structural violence, and dehumanization as-
sociated with imprisonment? Although some retributive theorists distinguish be-
tween what retributivism would require with regard to imprisonment in a 
reasonably just society as compared to an unjust society,366 and between mini-
mum conditions of confinement and extreme conditions of confinement,367 these 
modifications, while important corrections to other retributivist accounts, fail to 
consider broadly, imaginatively, and with sensitivity to present and historical con-
texts what justice might entail in more expansive terms.  For example, how does a 
criminal sentence of a period of years confirm the moral agency of the person sen-
tenced and that of the victim when it requires nothing beyond “doing time” from 
the offender and fails to work to prevent directly similar harms from befalling 
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similar victims?  Would it not be more just for all concerned to engage the perpe-
trator of violence and others in collective projects that would make victims whole 
and tend to prevent future harm? Why is justice cabined by the terms of retribu-
tivism rather than considering what is just with reference to the broader contexts 
in which human beings either flourish or suffer violence, poverty, and despair?  
My argument is not that the retributivist cannot respond to these questions. 
Nor is the problem that a retributivist lacks the theoretical resources to respond 
to these points from within a retributivist framework. Rather, my claim is that 
the main scholarly legal literature of a retributivist bent has simply failed to en-
gage with these questions. To meaningfully respond to these concerns, a retribu-
tivist must do more than point out that incarceration and other punitive 
responses are required by a respect for moral agency. Moreover, any account 
committed to a concern for the moral agency of persons must be able to ex-
plain why alternative, less violent, less degrading schemes of social coexist-
ence are less responsive to moral agency than punitive schemes organized 
around the criminal legal process.  
For these reasons, retributivist commitments should not retain such power-
ful force without an account of how retributivism stands to respond to and im-
prove existing conditions.  The hollowness of retributivist justice in this regard is 
suggested by the ready invocation of retributivist precepts by sentencing judges 
and harsh punishment’s supporters when actual punishment regimes so little 
conform to retributivist principles; yet, the malleability of a retributive framework 
that purports to match the harm and culpability of crimes to sentences, even if it 
is a misapplication of that framework, is routinely used to justify existing punish-
ment practices that extinguish the moral agency and diminished life chances of 
millions of persons in criminal custody or under criminal supervision in the Unit-
ed States.  What this elucidates is that matching punishments to crimes can rest 
hopelessly in the subjective eye of the sentencer and that of the detached retribu-
tivist observer, failing to account for the ultimate incommensurability of punish-
ment and crime when considered from the standpoint of the grounded victim or 
defendant, let alone the broader social setting in which both victim and defend-
ant coexist.  By grounded justice’s lights, popular invocations of retributive justice 
are narrow and pale allusions to justice, inattentive to human needs in their fuller, 
grounded complexity. 
An abolitionist ethic nonetheless confronts a second, separate potential 
problem with respect to which retributive justice fares better.  An abolitionist eth-
ic and framework require a fundamental reorientation in how we think and act, 
one far beyond the sorts of aspirational demands entailed by retributive justice.  
To be oriented toward the abolition of criminal punishment and to conceptualize 
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justice in a broader framework of social equality and prevention of harm is to sus-
pend at least much of the time what are now basic, instinctual reactions to partic-
ular sorts of wrongdoing, reactions of vengeance and anger that have become core 
to social thought and practice.  A shift toward abolition would involve transform-
ing ourselves and some of our most deeply held ideas and practices about blame, 
responsibility, and desert.  The challenge, then, of an abolitionist ethic and of 
prevention in a structural mode is that both require reconstructing how we con-
ceptualize crime, punishment, justice, and ultimately how we understand our-
selves.  The contention at the heart of this Article, though, is that we could 
change our social and criminal regulatory frameworks in quite significant meas-
ure, without losing too much that we cherish of ourselves.  Indeed, this trans-
formative work—the ethical, conceptual, institutional, regulatory, social, and 
structural shift it would entail—is consonant with other important shared ideas 
and values. 
CONCLUSION 
[T]here has never been a major social transformation in the history of 
mankind that has not been looked upon as unrealistic, idiotic, or uto-
pian by the large majority of experts even a few years before the un-
thinkable became reality.368 
In significant part, this Article’s aim has been to situate prison abolition—a 
critical project and nascent social movement effort often construed as off the 
wall—alongside and in conversation with core scholarly accounts in criminal law 
scholarship, criminology, and criminal law reformist discourse.369  Abolition, as 
explored in this Article, ought to occupy a more central place in criminal law 
scholarship, policy discourse, criminological analysis, and political philosophy 
than it has to date.  Prevention and grounded justice, reconceptualized as so-
cial and structural noncoercive undertakings, may offer means of articulating 
abolitionist aspirations in tandem with a commitment to crime prevention 
and repair of harm.  In the face of the suffering wrought by overincarceration, 
overcriminalization, and the racialized violence that haunts punitive policing and 
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imprisonment, a radical shift in our social and legal regulatory landscape is both 
necessary and possible.  This Article has argued that the regulation of interper-
sonal harm could begin to be fundamentally reimagined without undue negative 
repercussions by attending to a neglected conception of prevention and to 
grounded justice.  Ultimately, grounded justice’s promise is a world with less 
violence, both within and without the criminal law; more just, limited, and in-
creasingly diminishing use of the criminal process; and enlistment of an array 
of other institutions and social projects in working to promote collective peace. 
Abolition as an ethical and institutional framework—as an aspirational 
horizon for reform—is not unduly or merely utopian, but orients critical thought 
and reformist efforts toward meaningful and just legal, ethical, and institutional 
transformation to which we might commit ourselves.370  Nor is abolition through 
gradual decarceration and the incremental investment in other substitutive social 
projects apart from criminal law enforcement utterly implausible.  Faced with fis-
cal crises, many jurisdictions are actively rethinking their dependence on incarcer-
ation as a means of responding to criminalized conduct, including through de 
facto and de jure decriminalization.371  Although the elimination of the penal 
state in its current forms is difficult to imagine, as the German abolitionist crimi-
nologist Sebastian Scheerer suggested decades ago, so too were many other trans-
formative events, right up until the time they came to pass.  Among those once 
unfathomable historical transformations, one might recall the abolition of slavery, 
the end of the British Empire, the end of the Cold War, and the embrace of gay 
marriage around the world.  Rather than setting criminal law reformist ambitions 
exclusively on noncustodial criminal monitoring or punitive preventive measures 
with procedural constraints, and funding a “reentry industry” overseen by proba-
tion and parole departments (a currently ascendant punitive preventive regime), 
further elaboration of an abolitionist preventive framework may make available 
an array of less violent, less racialized, less coercive, and more just modes of reduc-
ing risks of interpersonal harm and promoting human flourishing. 
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